Fraudulent financial reporting: 1987-1997 : an analysis of U.S. public companies : research report by Beasley, Mark S. et al.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Historical Collection
1-1-1999
Fraudulent financial reporting: 1987-1997 : an
analysis of U.S. public companies : research report
Mark S. Beasley
Joseph V. Carcello
Dana R. Hermanson
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beasley, Mark S.; Carcello, Joseph V.; Hermanson, Dana R.; and Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission, "Fraudulent financial reporting: 1987-1997 : an analysis of U.S. public companies : research report" (1999). Association
Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 249.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc/249
F r a u d u l e n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g : 
1987-1997 
A n  A n a l y sis  o f  
U.S. P u b lic  C o m pa n ie s
R e sea r c h  C o m m issio ned  by  th e
C o m m itt ee  of S po n so r in g  O r g anizatio ns  
OF THE T readw ay  C o m m issio n
R esearch  R eport P repared
BY
M a r k  S. B e a s le y ,  Ph.D., CPA 
N o r t h  C a r o l i n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
J o se p h  V. C a r c e l l o ,  Ph.D., CPA, CIA, CMA
U n iv e r s it y  o f  T e n n e s s e e
D a n a  R. H erm a n so n , Ph.D., CPA 
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  C e n t e r  
K e n n e s a w  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g :  
1987-1997 
A n  A n a ly s is  o f  
U.S, P ub l ic  C o m pan ies
R e se a r c h  C o m m issio n e d  by  th e
C o m m ittee  of S po nso ring  O rganizations 
OF THE T readway C om m ission
R esea rc h  R eport  P repared
BY
M ark  S. B ea sl e y , Ph.D., CPA
N o r t h  C a r o l in a  S tate  U n iv e r s it y
J oseph  V. C a r c ello , Ph.D., CPA, CIA, CMA
U n iv e r s it y  o f  T e n n e s s e e
D ana R. H er m a nso n , Ph.D., CPA 
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  C e n t e r  
K e n n e s a w  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
Copyright © 1999 by the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
All rights reserved. For information about the procedure for requesting permission to make copies of any part of this 
work, please call the AICPA Copyright Permissions Hotline at 201-938-3245. A Permissions Request Form for emailing 
requests is available at www.aicpa.org by clicking on the copyright notice on any page. Otherwise, requests should be 
written and mailed to the Permissions Department, AICPA, Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, 
NJ 07311-3881.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0  TS 9 9
Letter from COSO Chairman iii
LETTER FROM COSO CHAIRMAN
March 1999
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is very pleased to have 
sponsored the study. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997. The study provides a comprehensive analy­
sis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by the SEC since the issuance of the 1987 Report 
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the “Treadway Commission” Report).
We believe the research results will be extremely useful to investors, regulators, stock exchanges, boards of 
directors, and external auditors. For the first time, we have a clear understanding of the who, why, where, and 
how of financial reporting fraud. This knowledge, properly applied, should help to further reduce the frequency 
and severity of the fraud problem in the United States.
Some of the more critical insights of the study are:
• The companies committing fraud generally were small, and most were not listed on the New York or 
American Stock Exchanges.
• The frauds went to the very top of the organizations. In 72 percent of the cases, the CEO appeared to be 
associated with the fraud.
• The audit committees and boards of the fraud companies appeared to be weak. Most audit committees 
rarely met, and the companies’ boards of directors were dominated by insiders and others with signifi­
cant ties to the company.
• A significant portion of the companies was owned by the founders and board members.
• Severe consequences resulted when companies committed fraud, including bankruptcy, significant 
changes in ownership, and delisting by national exchanges.
The study results highlight the need for an effective control environment, or “tone at the top.” The risk of fraud 
is much higher in small companies. A strong CEO with significant share ownership in a small organization 
needs an experienced, independent board to insure objectivity.
COSO’s mission is to improve the quality of financial reporting through internal controls, governance, and 
ethics. This study validates the need for continued focus on all three areas. We believe the study will provide a 
platform for those responsible for financial reporting to improve their effectiveness.
John J. Flaherty 
COSO Chairman
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SECTION I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
AND INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant 
consequences for the organization and for public con­
fidence in capital markets. Periodic high profile cases 
of fraudulent financial reporting raise concerns about 
the credibility of the U.S. financial reporting process 
and call into question the roles of auditors, regula­
tors, and analysts in financial reporting.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) sponsored this re­
search project to provide an extensive updated analy­
sis of financial statement fraud occurrences. While 
the work of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting in the mid-1980s identified nu­
merous causal factors believed to contribute to finan­
cial statement fraud, little empirical evidence exists 
about factors related to instances of fraud since the 
release of the 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987). Thus, 
COSO commissioned this research project to provide 
COSO and others with information that can be used 
to guide future efforts to combat the problem of fi­
nancial statement fraud and to provide a better under­
standing of financial statement fraud cases.
This research has three specific objectives:
• To identify instances of alleged fraudulent 
financial reporting by registrants of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
first described by the SEC in an Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) 
issued during the period 1987-1997.
• To examine certain key company and man­
agement characteristics for a sample of these 
companies involved in instances of financial 
statement fraud.
• To provide a basis for recommendations to 
improve the corporate financial reporting en­
vironment in the U.S.
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial report­
ing alleged by the SEC in AAERs issued during the 
11-year period between January 1987 and December 
1997. The AAERs, which contain summaries of en­
forcement actions by the SEC against public compa­
nies, represent one of the most comprehensive sources 
of alleged cases of financial statement fraud in the 
United States. We focused on AAERs that involved 
an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Se­
curities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act given that these represent the primary 
antifraud provisions related to financial statement re­
porting. Our focus was on cases that clearly involved 
financial statement fraud. We excluded from our 
analysis restatements of financial statements due to 
errors or earnings management activities that did not 
result in a violation of the federal antifraud statutes.
Our search identified nearly 300 companies involved 
in alleged instances of fraudulent financial reporting 
during the 11-year period. From this list of compa­
nies, we randomly selected approximately 200 com­
panies to serve as the final sample that we examined 
in detail. Findings reported in this study are based on 
information we obtained from our reading of (a) 
AAERs related to each of the sample fraud compa­
nies, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before and during 
the period the alleged financial statement fraud oc­
curred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged 
fraud period, and (d) business press articles about the 
sample companies after the fraud was disclosed.
Summary of Findings
Several key findings can be generalized from this de­
tailed analysis of our sample of approximately 200 
financial statement fraud cases. We have grouped 
these findings into five categories describing the na­
ture of the companies involved, the nature of the con­
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trol environment, the nature of the frauds, issues re­
lated to the external auditor, and the consequences to 
the company and the individuals allegedly involved.
Nature of Companies Involved
Relative to public registrants, companies 
committing financial statement fraud were 
relatively small. The typical size of most of 
the sample companies ranged well below 
$100 million in total assets in the year pre­
ceding the fraud period. Most companies (78 
percent of the sample) were not listed on the 
New York or American Stock Exchanges.
• Some companies committing the fraud 
were experiencing net losses or were in 
close to breakeven positions in periods be­
fore the fraud. Pressures of financial strain 
or distress may have provided incentives for 
fraudulent activities for some fraud compa­
nies. The lowest quartile of companies indi­
cates that they were in a net loss position, and 
the median company had net income of only 
$175,000 in the year preceding the first year 
of the fraud period. Some companies were 
experiencing downward trends in net income 
in periods preceding the first fraud period, 
while other companies were experiencing 
upward trends in net income. Thus, the sub­
sequent frauds may have been designed to 
reverse downward spirals for some compa­
nies and to preserve upward trends for oth­
ers.
Nature of the Control Environment 
(Top Management and the Board)
• Top senior executives were frequently in­
volved. In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs 
named the chief executive officer (CEO), and 
in 43 percent the chief financial officer (CFO) 
was associated with the financial statement 
fraud. When considered together, in 83 per­
cent of the cases, the AAERs named either or 
both the CEO or CFO as being associated with 
the financial statement fraud. Other individu­
als named in several AAERs include control­
lers, chief operating officers, other senior vice 
presidents, and board members.
Most audit committees only met about once 
a year or the company had no audit com­
mittee. Audit committees of the fraud com­
panies generally met only once per year. 
Twenty-five percent of the companies did not 
have an audit committee. Most audit com­
mittee members (65 percent) did not appear 
to be certified in accounting or have current 
or prior work experience in key accounting 
or finance positions.
Boards of directors were dominated by 
insiders and “gray” directors with signifi­
cant equity ownership and apparently little 
experience serving as directors of other 
companies. Approximately 60 percent of the 
directors were insiders or “gray” directors 
(i.e., outsiders with special ties to the com­
pany or management). Collectively, the di­
rectors and officers owned nearly one-third 
of the companies’ stock, with the CEO/presi­
dent personally owning about 17 percent. 
Nearly 40 percent of the boards had not one 
director who served as an outside or gray di­
rector on another company’s board.
Family relationships among directors and/ 
or officers were fairly common, as were 
individuals who apparently had significant 
power. In nearly 40 percent of the compa­
nies, the proxy provided evidence of family 
relationships among the directors and/or of­
ficers. The founder and current CEO were 
the same person or the original CEO/presi­
dent was still in place in nearly half of the 
companies. In over 20 percent of the compa­
nies, there was evidence of officers holding 
incompatible job functions (e.g., CEO and 
CFO).
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Nature of the Frauds
• Cumulative amounts of frauds were rela­
tively large in light of the relatively small 
sizes of the companies involved. The aver­
age financial statement misstatement or mis­
appropriation of assets was $25 million and 
the median was $4.1 million. While the av­
erage company had assets totaling $533 mil­
lion, the median company had total assets of 
only $16 million.
• Most frauds were not isolated to a single 
fiscal period. Most frauds overlapped at least 
two fiscal periods, frequently involving both 
quarterly and annual financial statements. 
The average fraud period extended over 23.7 
months, with the median fraud period extend­
ing 21 months. Only 14 percent of the sample 
companies engaged in a fraud involving fewer 
than 12 months.
• Typical financial statement fraud tech­
niques involved the overstatement of rev­
enues and assets. Over half the frauds in­
volved overstating revenues by recording rev­
enues prematurely or fictitiously. Many of 
those revenue frauds only affected transac­
tions recorded right at period end (i.e., quar­
ter end or year end). About half the frauds 
also involved overstating assets by understat­
ing allowances for receivables, overstating the 
value of inventory, property, plant and equip­
ment and other tangible assets, and recording 
assets that did not exist.
Issues Related to the External Auditor
• AH sizes of audit firms were associated with 
companies committing financial statement 
frauds. Fifty-six percent of the sample fraud 
companies were audited by a Big Eight/Six 
auditor during the fraud period, and 44 per­
cent were audited by non-Big Eight/Six au­
ditors.
All types of audit reports were issued dur­
ing the fraud period. A majority of the au­
dit reports (55 percent) issued in the last year 
of the fraud period contained unqualified 
opinions. The remaining 45 percent of the 
audit reports issued in the last year of the fraud 
departed from the standard unqualified 
auditor’s report because they addressed issues 
related to the auditor’s substantial doubt about 
going concern, litigation and other uncertain­
ties, changes in accounting principles, and 
changes in auditors between fiscal years com­
paratively reported. Three percent of the au­
dit reports were qualified due to a GAAP de­
parture during the fraud period.
Financial statement fraud occasionally 
implicated the external auditor. Auditors 
were explicitly named in the AAERs for 56 
of the 195 fraud cases (29 percent) where 
AAERs explicitly named individuals. They 
were named for either alleged involvement 
in the fraud (30 of 56 cases) or for negligent 
auditing (26 of 56 cases). Most of the audi­
tors explicitly named in an AAER (46 of 56) 
were non-Big Eight/Six auditors.
Some companies changed auditors during 
the fraud period. Just over 25 percent of 
the companies changed auditors during the 
time frame beginning with the last clean fi­
nancial statement period and ending with the 
last fraud financial statement period. A ma­
jority of the auditor changes occurred during 
the fraud period (e.g., two auditors were as­
sociated with the fraud period) and a major­
ity involved changes from one non-Big Eight/ 
Six auditor to another non-Big Eight/Six au­
ditor.
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Consequences for the Company and 
Individuals Involved
• Severe consequences awaited companies 
committing fraud. Consequences of finan­
cial statement fraud to the company often in­
clude bankruptcy, significant changes in own­
ership, and delisting by national exchanges, 
in addition to financial penalties imposed. A 
large number of the sample firms (over 50 
percent) were bankrupt/defunct or experi­
enced a significant change in ownership fol­
lowing disclosure of the fraud. Twenty-one 
percent of the companies were delisted by a 
national stock exchange.
• Consequences associated with fi nancial 
statement fraud were severe for individu­
als allegedly involved. Individual senior 
executives were subject to class action legal 
suits and SEC actions that resulted in finan­
cial penalties to the executives personally. A 
significant number of individuals were ter­
minated or forced to resign from their execu­
tive positions. However, relatively few indi­
viduals explicitly admitted guilt or eventually 
served prison sentences.
Summary of Implications
The research team analyzed the results to identify 
implications that might be relevant to senior manag­
ers, board of director and audit committee members, 
and internal and external auditors. The implications 
reflect the judgment and opinions of the research team, 
developed from the extensive review of information 
related to the cases involved. Hopefully the presen­
tation of these implications will lead to the consider­
ation of changes that can promote higher quality fi­
nancial reporting. The following implications are 
noted:
Implications Related to the Nature of the 
Companies Involved
• The relatively small size of fraud companies 
suggests that the inability or even unwilling­
ness to implement cost-effective internal con­
trols may be a factor affecting the likelihood 
of financial statement fraud (e.g., override of 
controls is easier). Smaller companies may 
be unable or unwilling to employ senior ex­
ecutives with sufficient financial reporting 
knowledge and experience. Boards, audit 
committees, and auditors need to challenge 
management to ensure that a baseline level 
of internal control is present.
• The national stock exchanges and regulators 
should evaluate the trade-offs of designing 
policies that might exempt small companies, 
given the relatively small size of the compa­
nies involved in financial statement fraud. A 
regulatory focus on companies with market 
capitalization in excess of $200 million may 
fail to target companies with greater risk for 
financial statement fraud activities.
• Given that some of the fraud firms were ex­
periencing financial strain in periods preced­
ing the fraud, effective monitoring of the 
organization’s going-concern status is war­
ranted, particularly as auditors consider new 
clients. In addition, the importance of effec­
tive communications with predecessor audi­
tors is highlighted by the fact that several 
observations of auditor changes were noted 
during the fraud period.
Implications Related to the Nature of the Con­
trol Environment (Top Management and the 
Board)
• The importance of the organization’s control 
environment cannot be overstated, as empha­
sized in COSO’s Internal Control -  Integrated 
Framework (COSO, 1992). Monitoring the 
pressures faced by senior executives (e.g., 
pressures from compensation plans, invest­
ment community expectations, etc.) is criti­
cal. The involvement of senior executives 
who are knowledgeable of financial report­
ing requirements, particularly those unique 
to publicly traded companies, may help to 
educate other senior executives about finan­
cial reporting issues and may help to restrain
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senior executives from overly aggressive re­
porting. In other cases, however, board mem­
bers and auditors should be alert for decep­
tive managers who may use that knowledge 
to disguise a fraud.
The concentration of fraud among companies 
with under $50 million in revenues and with 
generally weak audit committees highlights 
the importance of rigorous audit committee 
practices, even for smaller organizations. In 
particular, the number of audit committee 
meetings per year and the financial expertise 
of the audit committee members may deserve 
closer attention.
It is important to consider whether smaller 
companies should focus heavily on director 
independence and expertise, like large com­
panies are currently being encouraged to do. 
In the smaller company setting, due to the 
centralization of power in a few individuals, 
it may be especially important to have a solid 
monitoring function performed by the board.
An independent audit committee’s effective­
ness can be hindered by the quality and ex­
tent of information it receives. To perform 
effective monitoring, the audit committee 
needs access to reliable financial and nonfi­
nancial information, industry and other ex­
ternal benchmarking data, and other compara­
tive information that is prepared on a consis­
tent basis. Boards and audit committees 
should work to obtain from senior manage­
ment and other information providers relevant 
and reliable data to assist them in monitoring 
the financial reporting process.
Investors should be aware of the possible 
complications arising from family relation­
ships and from individuals (founders, CEO/ 
board chairs, etc.) who hold significant power 
or incompatible job functions. Due to the size 
and nature of the sample companies, the ex­
istence of such relationships and personal fac­
tors is to be expected. It is important to rec­
ognize that such conditions present both ben­
efits and risks.
Implications Related to the Nature of the 
Frauds
• The multi-period aspect of financial statement 
fraud, often beginning with the misstatement 
of interim financial statements, suggests the 
importance of interim reviews of quarterly 
financial statements and the related controls 
surrounding interim financial statement 
preparation, as well as the benefits of con­
tinuous auditing strategies.
• The nature of misstatements affecting rev­
enues and assets recorded close to or as of 
the fiscal period end highlights the importance 
of effective consideration and testing of in­
ternal control related to transaction cutoff and 
asset valuation. Based on the assessed risk 
related to internal control, the auditor should 
evaluate the need for substantive testing pro­
cedures to reduce audit risk to an acceptable 
level and design tests in light of this consid­
eration. Procedures affecting transaction cut­
off, transactions terms, and account valuation 
estimation for end-of-period accounts and 
transactions may be particularly relevant.
Implications Regarding the Roles of External 
Auditors
• There is a strong need for the auditor to look 
beyond the financial statements to understand 
risks unique to the client’s industry, 
management’s motivation toward aggressive 
reporting, and client internal control (particu­
larly the tone at the top), among other mat­
ters. As auditors approach the audit, infor­
mation from a variety of sources should be 
considered to establish an appropriate level 
of professional skepticism needed for each 
engagement.
• The auditor should recognize the potential 
likelihood for greater audit risk when audit­
ing companies with weak board and audit 
committee governance.
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Overview of Report
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. 
Section II provides a description of the approach we 
took to identify the sample cases of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting and contains a summary of the sources 
we used to gather data related to each sample case. 
Section III contains a summary of the results from 
our detailed analysis of approximately 200 cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
The detailed analysis of findings from this examina­
tion of fraudulent financial reporting violations pro­
duced numerous insights for further consideration. 
Section IV highlights those insights that have impli­
cations applicable to senior managers, board of di­
rector and audit committee members, and internal and 
external auditors. Section V provides a historical 
perspective on efforts related to financial statement 
fraud that have occurred since the issuance of the 
Treadway Commission’s 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987). 
That section highlights numerous efforts by a variety 
of organizations related to the roles of external audi­
tors, management, boards of directors, and audit com­
mittees.
Section VI provides an overview of significant find­
ings from academic research that has been conducted 
since the late 1980s. This overview provides a sum­
mary of key insights coming from academic litera­
ture that provide additional perspective on the finan­
cial statement fraud problem.
We are confident that this report. Fraudulent Finan­
cial Reporting: 1987-1997, will prove helpful to par­
ties concerned with corporate financial reporting. We 
hope it will stimulate greater awareness of opportu­
nities for improvements in the corporate financial re­
porting process.
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SECTION II 
DESCRIPTION OF 
RESEARCH APPROACH
The first step in this research project involved the iden­
tification of all alleged instances of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting captured by the SEC in an AAER is­
sued during the period 1987-1997. In order to obtain 
detailed publicly available information about com­
pany-wide and management characteristics of com­
panies involved, the focus of this study is on instances 
of fraudulent financial reporting allegedly commit­
ted by SEC registrants that ultimately led to the issu­
ance of an AAER.1
To identify instances of fraudulent financial report­
ing investigated by the SEC in the period 1987-1997, 
we read all AAERs issued by the SEC between Janu­
ary 1987 and December 1997. From our reading, we 
identified all AAERs that involved an alleged viola­
tion of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act (the Exchange Act), Section 17(a) of the 1933 
Securities Act (the Act), or other antifraud statutes. 
We focused on violations of these securities laws given 
that these sections of the 1933 Act and 1934 Exchange 
Act are the primary antifraud provisions related to 
financial statement reporting. Because these securi­
ties provisions generally require the intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud, they more specifically indi­
cate alleged instances of financial statement fraud than 
do other provisions of the securities laws.2
The AAERs represent one of the most comprehen­
sive sources of alleged, discovered cases of financial 
statement fraud in the United States, However, such 
an approach does limit the ability to generalize the 
results of this study to other settings. Because the
1Publicly traded partnerships, broker-dealers, and unit investment trusts 
were excluded from this study.
2We did not include frauds whose only consequence gave rise to a poten­
tial contingent liability (e.g., an “indirect effect illegal act” such as a 
violation of Environmental Protection Agency regulations).
identification of fraud cases is based on review of 
AAERs, the findings are potentially biased by the 
enforcement strategies employed by the staff of the 
SEC. Because the SEC is faced with constrained re­
sources, there is the possibility that not all cases of 
identified fraud occurring in the U.S. are addressed 
in the AAERs. There may be a heavier concentration 
of companies contained in the AAERs where the SEC 
assesses the probability of successful finding of fi­
nancial statement fraud as high. In addition, the cases 
contained in the AAERs represent instances where 
the SEC alleged the presence of financial statement 
fraud. In most instances, the company and/or indi­
viduals involved admitted no guilt. To the extent that 
enforcement biases are present, the results of this study 
are limited. However, given no better publicly avail­
able source of alleged financial statement fraud in­
stances, this approach is optimal under the circum­
stances.
For purposes of this report, the term “fraudulent fi­
nancial reporting” represents the intentional material 
misstatement of financial statements or financial dis­
closures or the perpetration of an illegal act that has a 
material direct effect on the financial statements or 
financial disclosures. The term financial statement 
fraud is distinguished from other causes of materially 
misleading financial statements, such as unintentional 
errors and other corporate improprieties that do not 
necessarily cause material inaccuracies in financial 
statements. Throughout this report, references to 
fraudulent financial reporting are all in the context of 
material misstatements. Our study excludes restate­
ments of financial statements due to errors or earn­
ings management activities that did not result in a vio­
lation of the federal antifraud securities provisions.
Our reading of AAERs during this period allowed us 
to develop a comprehensive list of companies inves­
tigated by the SEC during 1987-1997 for alleged fi­
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nancial statement fraud. We read over 800 AAERs, 
beginning with AAER #123 and ending with AAER 
#1004. From this process, we identified nearly 300 
companies involved in alleged instances of fraudu­
lent financial reporting. For each of these compa­
nies, we accumulated information about the specific 
security law violation to ensure that the AAER in­
volved an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 or Sec­
tion 17(a) or other federal antifraud statutes.
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases issued from 1987-1997 address 
nearly 300 instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Using the listing of alleged cases of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting during the period 1987-1997, we ran­
domly selected approximately 200 companies to serve 
as the final sample to be examined in detail as a part 
of this study. For each of the sample companies, we 
collected extensive information to create a compre­
hensive database on company and management char­
acteristics surrounding instances of financial statement 
fraud from our reading of (a) AAERs related to the 
alleged fraud, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before 
and during the period the alleged financial statement 
fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the 
alleged fraud period, and (d) business press articles 
written about the sample companies after the fraud 
was revealed.
Data Obtained from AAERs
We read all AAERs issued during 1987-1997 related 
to the alleged financial statement fraud for each of 
the sample companies. In many cases, several AAERs 
related to a single fraud at one company. From our 
reading, we attempted to capture the following infor­
mation:
1. A list of the specific annual (Form 10-Ks) or quar­
terly financial statements (Form 10-Qs) fraudu­
lently misstated and other filings with the SEC 
(e.g., S-1 registration statements) that incorpo­
rated fraudulently misstated financial statements. 
From this, we were able to determine the length
of time the alleged fraud occurred. In many cases, 
we were also able to identify the auditor and the 
national stock exchange where company stock 
traded.
2. A brief description of the nature of the fraud alle­
gations, including a description of how the fraud 
was allegedly perpetrated.
3. The dollar amounts of the fraud and the primary 
accounts affected.
4. Identification of types of personnel and outsiders 
involved in the fraud.
5. An indication of the alleged motivation for com­
mitting the fraud.
6. The industry in which the company operates.
7. The geographic location of the business unit 
where the alleged fraud occurred.
8. An indication of any internal control weaknesses 
that presented the opportunity for the financial 
statement fraud to occur.
9. A summary of the reported outcome of the SEC’s 
investigation, including disciplinary action against 
senior management personnel.
Data Obtained from Audited Financial 
Statements
We also obtained copies of annual financial statements 
filed in a Form 10-K with the SEC. We specifically 
obtained copies of two different sets of financial state­
ments. The first set represented the audited financial 
statements included in the Form 10-K filed with the 
SEC for the fiscal period preceding the first known 
instance of fraudulently misstated financial statements 
for each of the sample companies (“last clean finan­
cial statements”). The second set of financial state­
ments represented the audited financial statements in 
the Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the last fiscal 
year in which the alleged instance of the financial 
statement fraud occurred (“last fraud financial state­
ments”).
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We read the last clean financial statements to identify 
the auditor responsible for auditing the financial state­
ments before the first set of fraudulently misstated 
financial statements was issued. In addition to ob­
taining information about the auditor, we reviewed 
these Form 10-Ks to determine which national ex­
change the company’s stock was listed on prior to the 
fraud. We also obtained copies of the balance sheet 
and income statement to have benchmark informa­
tion about specific account balances (i.e., net sales, 
net income, total assets, and stockholders’ equity) be­
fore the fraud occurred. We reviewed the last fraud 
financial statements to identify the name of the audi­
tor in place and the nature of the audit opinion in the 
last period in which the financial statement fraud was 
allegedly in process.
Data Obtained from Proxy Statements
We obtained copies of the last (or the one available 
closest to the last) proxy statement sent to sharehold­
ers during the period in which the alleged financial 
statement fraud was in process. We reviewed these 
proxy statements to gather information about the char­
acteristics of the board of directors and audit com­
mittee (composition, number of meetings, etc.).
Data from Business Press Articles
To obtain information about consequences for the 
company and for senior management subsequent to 
the revelation of the financial statement fraud, we 
performed an extensive search using the Lexis/Nexis 
database of financial press articles. For each of the 
sample companies, we performed a search of the 
“General Business and Financial Sources” and the 
“Major Newspapers” databases at Lexis/Nexis for the 
period beginning with the date of the last set of finan­
cial statements fraudulently misstated and ending two 
years after the date of the last AAER issued by the 
SEC in relation to the financial statement fraud under 
investigation. We generated a listing of all articles in 
these databases issued during the time period de­
scribed. We used that listing to obtain approximately 
50 abstracts of articles published in selected business 
press sources during that time for each sample com­
pany, if available. We first generated abstracts of ar­
ticles appearing in The Wall Street Journal and The
New York Times. For companies not appearing regu­
larly in one of these two newspapers, we also obtained 
abstracts of articles appearing in Reuters Financial 
Service and PR Newswire to generate a sufficient num­
ber of article abstracts. For some companies, there 
was a limited number of articles included in these 
databases due to minimal press coverage. Thus, the 
number of article abstracts reviewed was less than 50 
in those cases.
We reviewed the article abstracts to capture any in­
formation related to consequences of the financial 
statement fraud. We captured information about 
whether the company had experienced financial dif­
ficulty to the point of being placed in bankruptcy, in 
liquidation or conservatorship, or had been sold (in­
cluding the sale of significant portions of assets). We 
also reviewed the articles to determine if the com­
pany was delisted from one of the national stock ex­
changes and to determine if the company was the de­
fendant in litigation related to the alleged financial 
statement fraud. We also reviewed the articles to ob­
tain information about the consequences of the rev­
elation of the alleged fraud for senior management. 
We captured information disclosing the resignation 
or termination of senior management and informa­
tion disclosing indictments, fines, or sentencings of 
senior management in relation to the alleged fraud. 
Finally, we captured information about whether se­
nior management was named as a defendant in law­
suits related to the alleged instance of financial state­
ment fraud.
Data Limitations
Readers should recognize that, despite our best ef­
forts to collect complete data for all sample compa­
nies, the data sources used were often incomplete. For 
example, AAERs were uneven in their level of dis­
closure, and other sources (e.g., Form 10-Ks, etc.) 
often were not available.
In addition to data availability issues, readers should 
also recognize that a great deal of professional judg­
ment was necessary as we collected and synthesized 
the data. We believe that we have been reasonable 
and consistent in our judgments, but the research ap­
proach is limited by the quality of our judgments.
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SECTION III 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF INSTANCES 
OF FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING: 
1987-1997
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial report­
ing reported by the SEC in AAERs issued between 
January 1987 and December 1997. After reading over 
800 AAERs, we identified nearly 300 companies in­
volved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting.1 From this list of companies, we randomly 
selected 220 companies to examine in detail. How­
ever, because of significant data limitations, we were 
unable to include 16 of those companies in our analy­
sis. Thus, the final sample examined in this study 
involves 204 fraud companies. In most instances, 
these fraud cases represent allegations of financial 
statement fraud made by the SEC without the com­
pany and/or individuals named in the AAER admit­
ting guilt.
This section contains a summary of the key findings 
from our reading of (a) AAERs related to each of the 
204 companies, (b) Form 10-Ks filed before and dur­
ing the period the alleged financial statement fraud 
occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the al­
leged fraud period, and (d) business press articles 
written about the sample companies after the fraud 
was disclosed.
Nature of Companies Involved 
Financial Profile of Sample Companies
We were able to obtain the last clean financial state­
ments for 99 of the 204 sample companies. Table 1
highlights selected financial statement information for 
these 99 companies.2
The sample companies are relatively small in size. 
While total assets, total revenues, and stockholders’ 
equity averaged $533 million, $233 million, and $86 
million respectively, the median of total assets was 
only $15.7 million, the median of total revenues was 
only $13 million, and the median of stockholders’ 
equity was only $5 million in the period ending be­
fore the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total 
assets of $74 million, total revenues of $53 million, 
and stockholders’ equity of $17 million, most of the 
sample companies operated well under the $100 mil­
lion size range.
Most companies had assets and revenues less 
than $100 million preceding the fraud.
1Generally there are multiple AAERs related to the fraud at a single com­
pany.
2Our primary source o f previously issued financial statements is the Q 
File database, which is a microfiche database o f selected SEC filings. 
Because public companies voluntarily submit their SEC filings for in­
clusion in the Q File database, financial statements for the particular 
period o f interest were often not available in Q File. Thus, we were 
unable to obtain fincancial statements for all sample fraud companies. 
We then contacted Disclosure Inc., which is the official repository of 
SEC documents, to request copies o f financial statements we could not 
locate on Q File. Disclosure Inc. provided what they had available, but 
we were still unable to locate all financial statements identified. The last 
clean financial statements were generally not available because (1) all 
financial statements filed with the SEC were fraudulent (fraud began 
before going public), (2) some companies actually never filed financial 
statements with the SEC, or (3) other miscellaneous reasons that restricted 
availability.
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Table 1 -  Financial Profile of Sample Companies (n=99 companies) 
Last Financial Statements Prior to Beginning of Fraud Period
Mean
Median
Minimum Value 
Quartile 
Quartile 
Maximum Value
Assets
$532,766
$15,681
$0
$2,598
$73,879
$17,880,000
(in OOO’s)
Revenues
$232,727
$13,043
$0
$1,567
$53,442
$11,090,000
Net
Income (Loss)
$8,573
$175
($37,286)
($448)
$2,164
$329,000
Stockholders’ 
Equity (Deficit)
$86,107
$5,012
($4,516)
$1,236
$17,037
$2,772,000
Some of the sample companies were financially 
stressed in the period preceding the fraud period. The 
median net income was only $175,000, with the low­
est quartile of companies facing net losses. The third 
quartile of companies had net income just over $2 
million in the year before the fraud allegedly began.
We also analyzed income statements for the last two 
years before the year of the last clean financial state­
ments. Net income increased in the one-year period 
from the year before the last clean financial statements 
to the year of the last clean financial statements for
49 of the 99 companies. Of these 49 companies, net 
income for 30 companies increased for two years in a 
row. Net income decreased in the one-year period 
from the year before the last clean financial statements 
to the year of the last clean financial statements for 
43 of the 99 companies. Of these 43 companies, net 
income for 22 companies decreased two years in a 
row. We were unable to observe any trends for seven 
of 99 companies because they were in their first year 
of operations or represented development stage com­
panies with no meaningful income statement results.
To summarize, it appears that 22 companies experi­
enced a downward trend in net income preceding the 
first year of the fraud, while 30 companies experi­
enced an upward trend. This suggests that the subse­
quent frauds may have been designed to reverse down­
ward spirals for some companies and to preserve up­
ward trends for other companies.
National Stock Exchange Listings
We reviewed the AAERs and the “last clean financial 
statements” to identify the national stock exchange 
where each of the companies’ stock traded. We were 
able to identify the stock exchange listing for 134 of 
the 204 sample companies. As indicated in Table 2, 
most (78 percent) were traded in Over-the-Counter 
Markets.3 Approximately 15 percent of the compa­
nies’ stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
and approximately seven percent of the companies’ 
stock traded on the American Stock Exchange.
3Over-the-Counter Markets include stocks traded on the NASDAQ Na­
tional Market System, the NASDAQ Small-Cap Market, electronic bul­
letin boards, pink sheets, and other situations where investors contact 
dealers (brokers) when they want to buy or sell a security.
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Table 2 -  Sample Companies’ National Stock Exchange Listing
Percentage of
National Stock Exchange Number of Companies Companies
New York Stock Exchange 20 15%
American Stock Exchange 10 7%
Over-the-Counter Markets 104 78%
Number of sample companies 134 100%
with available stock
exchange information
Table 3 -  Primary Industries of Sample Companies
Number of Fraud
Percentage
of
Companies in Fraud
Industry Classification Industry Companies
Computer hardware/software 25 15%
Other manufacturers 25 15%
Financial service providers 23 14%
Healthcare and health products 19 11%
Retailers/wholesalers 14 8%
Other service providers 14 8%
Mining/oil and gas 13 8%
Telecommunication companies 10 6%
Insurance 6 4%
Real estate 5 3%
Miscellaneous 14 8%
Number of sample companies with 168 100%
available information on industry
Industries for Companies Involved
We reviewed the information included in the AAERs 
to determine the primary industry in which the fraud 
companies operated. We were unable to identify the 
primary industry for 36 of the 204 sample companies. 
For the 168 companies where we were able to iden­
tify the primary industry, the industries affected most 
frequently included computer hardware and software 
(15 percent), other manufacturing (15 percent), finan­
cial services (14 percent), and healthcare/health prod­
ucts (11 percent). Of course, other industries could 
be more prevalent if different time periods were ex­
amined. See Table 3.
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Geographic Location of Sample Companies
We reviewed the AAERs to identify the geographic 
location of the companies involved in committing the 
financial statement fraud. Most of the frauds were 
committed at or directed from the companies’ head­
quarters locations. Table 4 contains information about 
the frequency of cases for states in which at least four
of the 204 sample companies were located. The states 
where most of the sample companies were located 
are California (16 percent of the fraud cases), New 
York (11 percent of the fraud cases), Florida (eight 
percent of the fraud cases), Texas (six percent of the 
fraud cases) and New Jersey (five percent of the 
sample fraud cases). This pattern is consistent with 
centers of business activity in the United States.
Table 4 -  Locations of Sample Companies
States Containing at Least Four Number of Sample Percentage of Sample
Sample Company Headquarters Companies in State Companies in State
California 33 16%
New York 23 11%
Florida 17 8%
Texas 12 6%
New Jersey 10 5%
Colorado 6 3%
Nevada 5 3%
Ohio 5 3%
Pennsylvania 5 3%
Arizona 4 2%
Massachusetts 4 2%
States with less than 3 sample
fraud companies 80 38%
204 100%
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Nature of the Control Environment 
(Top Management and the Board)
Individuals Named in the AAERs
From our reading of the AAERs related to the 204 
sample companies, we captured information about the 
types of company representatives and outsiders named 
in an AAER related to each instance of alleged fraudu­
lent financial reporting. We captured all individuals 
listed in any of the AAERs related to an instance of 
fraudulent financial reporting, whether these individu­
als were charged with fraud or charged with other 
lesser violations. We were able to obtain information 
about the types of individuals named for 195 of the 
204 fraud companies. Even though these individuals 
were named in an AAER, there is no certain evidence 
that all the named participants violated the antifraud 
statutes. In addition, most of the named participants 
admitted no guilt of any kind.
Using the highest managerial tide for an individual, 
we summarized the typical employee positions in­
volved. For example, if one individual had the tides 
of chief financial officer (CFO) and controller, we 
report that as involving strictly the CFO position in 
our reporting in Table 5. As noted in Table 5, the 
senior executive most frequently named in an AAER 
was the chief executive officer (CEO). The CEO was 
named as one of the parties involved in 141 of 195 
sample companies, representing 72 percent of the 
sample companies with available information. The 
second most frequently identified senior executive 
named was the CFO. The CFO was named in 84 of 
the 195 sample companies, which represents 43 per­
cent of the companies involved. When considered 
together, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 162 of 
the 195 (83 percent) company frauds.
Table 5 -  Types and Frequencies of Individuals Named
Individual’s Relation to Company # of Companies
Percentage of Fraud 
Cases4
Chief executive officer (CEO) 141 72%
Chief financial officer (CFO) 84 43%
Either or both CEO or CFO involved 162 83%
Controller 41 21%
Chief operating officer (COO) 13 7%
Other vice president positions 35 18%
Board of director (non-management) 21 11%
Lower level personnel 19 10%
Outsiders (e.g., auditors, customers) 74 38%
No tides given 30 15%
Other tides 24 12%
Note: We used the highest managerial title for an individual. For example, if a person served as CFO and controller, we classified that 
person as CFO when presenting results in this table. This classification scheme may contribute to the lower percentages associated with 
less senior positions in the firm. In addition, due to the relatively small size of fraud companies, many o f the positions, such as chief 
operating officer, were not in existence at these companies, thus reducing the noted percentages for these less common positions.
4This represents the percentage of the 195 companies with individuals named for each of the positions highlighted in this table.
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The CEO and/or CFO were named in an 
AAER for 83 percent of the sample fraud 
companies.
The company controller was named in 41 of the 195 
frauds, representing 21 percent of the fraud instances. 
The chief operating officer (COO) was named in seven 
percent of the frauds (13 of 195), and other vice presi­
dents were named in 35 of the 195 frauds (18 percent 
of the cases). Lower level personnel were named in 
10 percent of the cases (19 of 195 fraud instances). 
Recall that our classification scheme tracked the high­
est named position for an individual. Thus, the noted 
percentages associated with less senior positions may 
be understated. In addition, because of the relatively 
small size of many of the fraud firms in this sample, 
some of the noted positions (e.g., chief operating of­
ficer) may not have been filled. Finally, SEC enforce­
ment actions may target top executives more fre­
quently than lower level employees. These factors 
may contribute to the lower percentages noted for 
these positions.
Individuals named in the AAERs extended beyond 
company executives. In 21 of the 195 fraud compa­
nies (11 percent of the cases), nonmanagement board 
of director members were named. In 38 percent of 
the fraud cases (74 of the 195 fraud cases), other out­
siders were named, including the external auditor, 
customers, and promoters of the company’s stock.
Alleged Motivation for the Fraud
In several instances, the AAERs provided some dis­
cussion of the alleged motivation for why company 
representatives committed the fraud. The most com­
monly cited reasons include committing the fraud to:
• Avoid reporting a pre-tax loss and to bolster 
other financial results;
• Increase the stock price to increase the ben­
efits of insider trading and to obtain higher 
cash proceeds when issuing new securities;
• Cover up assets misappropriated for personal 
gain; and
• Obtain national stock exchange listing status 
or maintain minimum exchange listing re­
quirements to avoid delisting.
Audit Committee Characteristics
We gathered information on the audit committee and 
board of directors from the proxy statements, which 
were available for 96 of the sample fraud companies. 
The proxies used were those closest to the end of the 
fraud period, so as to capture the nature of the board 
and audit committee during the fraud period.
Throughout this section, the following definitions are 
used:
• Inside director — Officer or employee of the 
company or a subsidiary; officer of an affili­
ated company.
• Gray director — Former officers or employ­
ees of the company, a subsidiary, or an affili­
ate; relatives of management; professional 
advisors to the company; officers or owners 
of significant suppliers or customers of the 
company; interlocking directors; officers or 
employees of other companies controlled by 
the CEO or the company’s majority owner; 
owners of an affiliate company; those who 
are creditors of the company.
• Outside director— No disclosed relationship 
(other than stock ownership) between the di­
rector and the company or its officers.
As reported in Table 6, 75 percent of the fraud com­
panies had an audit committee. These audit commit­
tees generally had three members, and they were typi­
cally composed of outside directors. On average, 
outside directors represented over 65 percent of the 
audit committee members, and nearly 70 percent of 
the companies had no inside directors on the audit 
committee. Nearly 40 percent of the companies had 
audit committees composed entirely of outside direc­
tors. Overall, the audit committees appear to be rea­
sonably independent.
The average number of audit committee meetings per 
year was 1.8, with a median of 1.0. Only 44 percent
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of the companies with an audit committee had a com­
mittee that met at least twice during the year. Some 
may question whether audit committees that meet only 
one or two times per year are functioning effectively. 
In addition, 12 companies had audit committees that 
did not meet at all, a clear sign of audit committees 
existing in name only.
Most of the audit committee members (65 percent) 
did not appear to be experts in accounting or finance. 
On an average basis, only 35 percent (median 33 per­
cent) of the audit committee members were certified 
as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), or Certified 
Financial Analyst (CFA), or had current or prior work
experience in serving as a CFO, VP of finance, con­
troller, treasurer, auditor, banker, investment banker, 
financial consultant, investment manager, or venture 
capitalist.
Finally, the audit committee disclosures provided evi­
dence of an internal audit function approximately 20 
percent of the time. Such a percentage appears rea­
sonable in light of the small size of the sample com­
panies.
Most of the fraud companies either had no 
audit committee or had an audit committee 
that met less than twice per year.
Table 6 - Audit Committee Profile
Item
# of Companies 
with Information Result
Existence of audit committee 96 75% had audit committee
Number of audit committee members 71 Mean = 3.0
Type of audit committee member: 
Insider 
Gray
71
Mean =11% 
Mean = 21%
Audit committees with no insiders 71 69%
Audit committees composed entirely of 
outside directors
71 38%
Number of audit committee meetings per year 66 Mean =1.8 
Median = 1.0
Audit committees meeting at least twice per year 66 44%
Percentage of audit committee members with 
accounting or finance expertise
71 Mean = 35%
Audit committee disclosures provide evidence 
of an internal audit function
63 19% mentioned internal 
audit function
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Board Characteristics
As shown in Table 7, the average board of directors 
was composed of seven members. Unlike the audit 
committees, the boards tended to be dominated by 
insiders and gray directors (60 percent on average). 
The most common types of gray directors were former 
company officers, company legal counsel, consultants, 
officers of significant customers or suppliers, and rela­
tives of management. The outside directors most com­
monly were employed as senior executives of other 
companies.
On average, the board members were approximately
50 years old and had served on the fraud company’s 
board for about five years. The directors of these 
companies rarely served as outside or gray directors 
of other companies (mean other directorships of 0.5 
per board). In fact, almost 40 percent of the fraud 
companies had boards where not one member served 
as an outside or gray director on another board. Over­
all, the directors appear to have limited experience as 
corporate monitors.
The directors and officers typically had a significant 
financial stake in the company. The directors and 
officers’ stock ownership of the companies averaged 
32 percent, with a median of 27 percent. The two 
largest individual stockholders who serve on the board 
or as an officer own an average of 26 percent (20 per­
cent median) of the stock of the company. When con­
sidering these two findings together, about 80 per­
cent of the ownership held by officers and directors is 
concentrated in the hands of the two largest stock­
holders serving on the board or serving as an officer. 
On an average (median) basis, the CEO/president 
personally owned 17 percent (12 percent) of company 
shares outstanding.
Finally, the boards generally met six or seven times 
per year. Over half of the boards met between four 
and six times.
The boards generally were dominated by insid­
ers or gray directors with significant equity own­
ership and apparently little experience serving 
as directors of other companies.
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Table 7 - Board of Directors Profile
Item
# of Companies 
with Information Result
Number of board members 96 Mean = 7.1
Type of board member: 96
Insider Mean = 43%
Gray Mean = 17%
Types of gray directors: 68
Former company officer 22%
Company legal counsel 17%
Consultant to company 16%
Officer of significant customer 13%
Officer of significant supplier 12%
Relative of management 9%
Positions held by outside directors: 96
Senior executive of another company 47%
Retired/former executive 8%
Attorney 7%
Consultant 7%
Director age 92 Mean = 51 years
Director tenure with board 90 Mean = 5.4 years
Other outside or gray directorships held by 95 Mean = 0.5 per board
any member of the board
Boards where not one member served as an 95 39%
outside or gray director on another board 
Percentage stock ownership by directors 96 Mean = 32%
and officers Median = 27%
Percentage stock ownership by CEO 96 Mean = 17%
or president Median = 12%
Percentage stock ownership by two largest 96 Mean = 26%
individual holders also serving on the board Median = 20%
or as a corporate officer 
Number of board meetings per year 93 Mean = 6.8
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Director and Officer Relationships and 
Personal Factors
We also examined the proxy statements for evidence 
of personal relationships among the directors and of­
ficers, as well as potentially conflicting job duties. 
As reported in Table 8, and consistent with the small 
size of the sample companies, family relationships 
among various directors and/or officers were disclosed 
for nearly 40 percent of the companies. When present, 
there generally were two such relationships per com­
pany.
The CEO and board chair were the same person in 66 
percent of the cases. The board chair was a non-com­
pany executive in 16 percent of cases. The company 
founder and the current CEO were the same person 
or the original CEO/president was still in place in 45 
percent of the companies.
We examined the officers’ titles for evidence of any 
incompatible job functions held by one individual. 
For example, authorization, asset custody, and record 
keeping should be kept separate when possible to 
maintain proper segregation of duties. In over 20 per­
cent of the cases, it appeared that senior executives 
held incompatible job functions (e.g., CEO and CFO, 
or COO and controller).
It does not appear that the sample companies repre­
sent tightly held family businesses given that the num­
ber of common shares held by non-officers or non­
directors averaged 8.5 million shares (median of 4.3 
million shares).
Family relationships among directors and/or 
officers were fairly common. Also, the 
founder and current CEO were the same per­
son or the original CEO/president was still in 
place in nearly half of the companies.
Table 8 - Director and Officer Relationships and Personal Factors
Item
# of Companies 
with Information Result
Family relationships among directors 
and/or officers were disclosed
96 38%
If present, number of family relationships 36 Mean = 2.3 
per company
CEO/president and board chair were 
same person
96 66%
Non-company executive was board chair 96 16%
Founder and current CEO were same person 
or the original CEO/ president was still in place
96 45%
Evidence of incompatible job functions held 
by officers (e.g., CEO and CFO, or COO and 
controller)
96 21%
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During our review of the proxy statements, we also 
noted the following miscellaneous events that may 
provide some indication of a higher likelihood for 
fraud:
• Officers and directors faced prior or current 
legal/regulatory actions against them person­
ally in eight percent of the cases (eight out of 
96 companies).
• At least one board member or officer had re­
signed within the prior two years in nine per­
cent of the cases (nine out of 96 companies). 
In seven of those nine cases, the resignations 
involved multiple officers and directors.
• Information about the CFO’s background was 
provided for 44 companies (where we also 
had the name of the audit firm). In five of 44 
companies (11 percent), the CFO had previ­
ous experience with the company’s audit firm 
immediately prior to joining the company.
• Material loans from the company to officers 
or directors outside the normal course of busi­
ness occurred for three percent of the compa­
nies (three of 96 companies).
Nature of the Frauds 
Total Amount of the Fraud
In an attempt to obtain a judgmental measure of the 
typical size of the financial statement frauds, we ac­
cumulated information from the AAERs that provided 
some indication of the amounts involved. In many 
cases, the AAERs did not disclose the dollar amounts 
involved. As a result, we were only able to obtain 
some measure of the dollar amounts involved for 148 
of the 204 sample companies. As reported in Table 9, 
on an overall cumulative basis, the average fraud in­
volved $25 million of cumulative misstatement or 
misappropriation over the fraud period, while the 
median fraud involved $4.1 million. The smallest 
fraud was $20,000 while the largest totaled $910 mil­
lion. The first and third quartiles of cumulative mis­
statements or misappropriations were $1.6 million and 
$11.76 million, respectively.5
On an overall cumulative basis, the average 
fraud was $25 million, while the median fraud 
was $4.1 million.
5Ideally, we would report misstatement information in percentage rather 
than dollar terms. However, we are unable to report percentages for most 
companies due to the limited amount o f information provided in the 
AAERs about dollar misstatements and the lack of available financial 
statements for all fraud periods (which reflect misstated values anyway) 
for those companies with related AAERs reporting misstatement infor­
mation.
Table 9 -  Cumulative $ Amount of Fraud for a Single Company
Mean Median
# of Sample Cumulative Cumulative
Companies Misstatement or Misstatement or
with Misappropriation Misappropriation
Information (in $ millions) (in $ millions)
Cumulative Amount of
Fraud for a Single Company
Minimum = $20,000 
Maximum = $910 million 
1st quartile = $1.6 million 
3rd quartile = $11.76 million
148 $25.0 $4.1
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Unfortunately, the AAERs do not consistently report 
the dollar amounts involved in each fraud. In some 
instances, the AAERs report the dollar amounts of 
the fraud by noting the extent that assets were mis­
stated. In other cases, the AAERs report the amounts 
that either revenues, net income, or pre-tax income 
were misstated. We used the type of fraud and the 
nature of the data presented in the AAER to develop 
the most appropriate measure of the fraud amount 
(e.g., asset frauds expressed as misstatements of as­
sets, etc.). Information about the amounts involved 
by fraud type for 143 companies is provided in Table 
10.
Asset misstatements averaged $39.4 million, with a 
median of $4.9 million. The average misstatements 
of revenues, pre-tax income, and net income ranged 
from $9.2 million to $16.5 million, with medians rang­
ing from $2.3 million to $5.4 million. The average 
misappropriation of assets was $77.5 million, while 
the median misappropriation of assets was $2.0 mil­
lion.
While Tables 9 and 10 provide information about the 
average and median cumulative effects of the fraud 
over the entire fraud period, Table 11 provides an 
overview of the largest income misstatement in a 
single period. For each of the companies where the 
related AAERs reported misstatement information as 
a function of pre-tax income or net income, we iden­
tified the largest single-year or single-quarter misstate­
ment over that company’s fraud period. For the 
AAERs providing misstatement information relative 
to pre-tax income (48 companies), the average of the 
largest pre-tax misstatement in a single period was 
$7.1 million, with a median single period pre-tax mis­
statement of $3.2 million. For AAERs reporting mis­
statements as a function of net income (41 compa­
nies), the average largest single period misstatement 
of net income was $9.9 million with median single 
period net income misstatement of $2.2 million.
Table 10 -  Amount of $ Misstatements by Fraud Type
Misstatement Type
# of Sample 
Companies
Mean Cumulative 
Misstatement 
(in $ millions)
Median Cumulative 
Misstatement 
(in $ millions)
Asset Misstatements 38 $39.4 $4.9
Revenue or Gain 
Misstatements
32 $9.6 $4.4
Net Income 
Misstatements
31 $16.5 $2.3
Pre-tax Income 
Misstatements
30 $9.2 $5.4
Misappropriations of 
Assets
12 $77.5 $2.0
Note: See Table 1 for the typical size o f the companies involved.
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Table 11 -  Largest Single Period Income Misstatement
Description
Information reported as 
a function of pre-tax income
Information reported as a 
function of net income
# of Sample 
Companies
48
41
Mean Largest Single 
Year or Quarter 
Misstatement 
(in $ millions)
$7.1
$9.9
Median Largest Single 
Year or Quarter 
Misstatement 
(in $ millions)
$3.2
$2.2
Timing of Fraud Period
For the 204 instances of fraudulent financial report­
ing included in our final sample, the related fraudu­
lently misstated financial statements were issued in 
calendar years beginning in 1980 and extending 
through 1997. No clear trend is apparent across the 
period of this study.
Typical Length of Fraud Period
The financial statement frauds generally involved 
multiple fiscal periods. Information to determine the 
number of months from the beginning of the first fraud 
period to the end of the last fraud period was avail­
able for 197 of the 204 sample companies. For those 
197 companies, the number of months from the be­
ginning of the first fraud period to the end of the last 
fraud period averaged 23.7 months with a median of 
21 months. Most of the fraud periods overlapped a 
portion of two fiscal years by either misstating the 
annual or quarterly financial statements in at least two 
fiscal periods. Many of the frauds began with mis­
statements of interim financial statements that were 
continued in annual financial statement filings. Only 
27 of the 197 companies (14 percent) issued fraudu­
lent financial statements involving a period less than
12  months. The longest fraud period extended to six 
years (72 months) for one of the sample companies.
Methods of Fraudulently Reporting 
Financial Statement Information
Based upon information included in the AAERs, we 
made our best attempt at identifying the methods used 
to fraudulently report the financial statement infor­
mation. As noted in Table 12, the two most common 
techniques used to fraudulently misstate financial 
statement information involved improper revenue rec­
ognition techniques to overstate revenues and im­
proper techniques to overstate assets. Fifty percent 
of the 204 sample companies recorded revenues in­
appropriately, primarily by recording revenues pre­
maturely or by creating fictitious revenue transactions.
Fifty percent of the 204 sample companies overstated 
assets by overvaluing existing assets, recording ficti­
tious assets or assets not owned, or capitalizing items 
that should have been expensed.6 Eighteen percent 
of the 204 companies’ financial statements were mis­
stated through the understatement of expenses or li­
abilities. Most of the financial statement fraud in­
stances involved intentionally misstating financial 
statement information, with only 12 percent of the 
fraud cases involving misappropriation of company 
assets. This is consistent with the finding in the 1987 
Report o f the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting that 13 percent of the cases 
against public companies involved misappropriations 
of assets (p. 112).
Financial statement fraud tends to involve 
multiple fiscal periods.
6To avoid double-counting, the information about the overstatement o f 
assets does not include overstatements o f accounts receivable due to the 
revenue recognition frauds.
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Table 12 -  Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques
Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements
Percentage of the 204 Sample 
Companies Using a Fraud 
Method
Improper Revenue Recognition:
Recording fictitious revenues -  26% 
Recording revenues prematurely -  24% 
No description/ “overstated” -  16%
50%
Overstatement of Assets (excluding accounts receivable 
overstatements due to revenue fraud): a
Overstating existing assets -  37%
Recording fictitious assets or 
assets not owned -  12%
Capitalizing items that 
should be expensed -  6%
50%
Understatement of Expenses/Liabilities: 18%
Misappropriation of Assets: 12%
Inappropriate Disclosure (with no financial 
statement line-item effects): 8%
Other Miscellaneous Techniques: 20%
a Note: The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the category totals due to multiple types 
of fraud employed at a single company.
Fraudulent misstatement of financial statements 
frequently involves the overstatement of rev­
enues and assets. Intentional misstatement of 
financial statements is noted much more fre­
quently than misappropriation of assets.
Eight percent of the 204 sample companies issued 
statements or press releases with inappropriate dis­
closures (without financial statement line-item ef­
fects). There were a variety of other miscellaneous 
fraud techniques used, including inappropriate ac­
counting for acquisition transactions, misstating capi­
tal or surplus accounts, forging audit opinions, and 
engaging auditors who are not CPAs or public accoun­
tants. Because the financial statement frauds at the 
sample companies often involved more than one fraud
technique, the sum of the percentages reported ex­
ceeds 100 percent.
As noted above, half of the sample companies over­
stated revenues. The revenue misstatements were 
primarily due to recording revenues prematurely or 
fictitiously by employing a variety of techniques that 
include the following:
• Sham sales. To cover the fraud, company 
representatives often falsified inventory 
records, shipping records, and invoices. In 
some cases, the company recorded sales for 
goods merely shipped to another company 
location. In other cases, the company pre­
tended to ship goods to appear as if a sale 
occurred and then hid the related inventory
Section III — Detailed Analysis of Instances of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 25
(which was never shipped to customers) from 
company auditors.
Premature revenues before all the terms 
of the sale were completed. Generally this 
involved recording sales after the goods were 
ordered but before they were shipped to the 
customer.
Conditional sales. These transactions were 
recorded as revenues even though the sales 
involved unresolved contingencies or the 
terms of the sale were amended subsequently 
by side letter agreements that often eliminated 
the customer’s obligation to keep the mer­
chandise.
Improper cutoff of sales. To increase rev­
enues, the accounting records were held open 
beyond the balance sheet date to record sales 
of the subsequent accounting period in the 
current period.
Improper use of the percentage of comple­
tion method. Revenues were overstated by 
accelerating the estimated percentage of 
completion for projects in process.
Unauthorized shipments. Revenues were 
overstated by shipping goods never ordered 
by the customer or by shipping defective prod­
ucts and recording revenues at full, rather than 
discounted, prices.
• Consignment sales. Revenues were recorded 
for consignment shipments or shipments of 
goods for customers to consider on a trial 
basis.
In several instances, the fraud was not detected by 
external auditors because company representatives 
were able to falsify confirmation responses directly 
or indirectly by convincing third parties to alter the 
confirmation response.
Half of the sample companies misstated the financial 
statement information by overstating assets. Table
13 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by 
sample companies. Even excluding the effects of mis­
stating accounts receivable due to the revenue recog­
nition frauds, the two most common asset accounts 
misstated were inventory and accounts receivable. 
Other asset accounts misstated included property, 
plant and equipment, loans/notes receivable, cash, in­
vestments, patent accounts, and valuations of oil, gas, 
and mineral reserves.
Asset misstatements frequently involve; 
Understating receivable allowances. 
Inflating existing asset values by using 
higher market versus cost values. 
Recording nonexistent assets.
Table 13 -  Asset Accounts Frequently Misstated
Asset Accounts Typically # of Sample
Overstated Companies Involved
Inventory 24
Accounts Receivable 21
(other than revenue fraud)
Property, Plant, & Equipment 15
Loans/Notes Receivable 11
Cash 7
Investments 7
Patents 7
Oil, Gas, & Mineral Reserves 7
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Table 14 -  Size of Audit Firms Issuing Reports on 
Fraudulent Financial Statements
Auditor Type
Big Eight/Six Auditor 
Non-Big Eight/Six Auditor
Number of Sample 
Companies with Auditor 
Information Available
94
73
167
Percentage of Sample 
Companies with Auditor 
Information Available
56%
44%
100%
Issues Related to the External Auditor 
Auditors Associated with Fraud Companies
We reviewed the last set of audited financial state­
ments issued during the fraud period to identify the 
auditor responsible for issuing an audit opinion on 
those fraudulently misstated financial statements. We 
were able to obtain the auditor’s report for the last 
fraudulently issued financial statements for 141 of the 
204 sample fraud companies. In addition to reading 
the auditor’s report, we were able to identify the au­
ditor associated with the fraud period from informa­
tion contained in the AAERs for an additional 26 
sample fraud companies. Based on our review of the 
auditor’s report for the last set of fraudulent state­
ments (supplemented by information contained in re­
lated AAERs), we were able to identify the auditor 
for 167 of the 204 sample companies.
As reported in Table 14, we found that the Big Eight/ 
Six audited 56 percent of the sample fraud compa­
nies (94 of the 167 companies) in the last year of the 
fraud period, with the remaining 44 percent (73 of 
the 167 companies) audited by a non-Big Eight/Six 
auditor. Based on a supplemental analysis (not re­
ported in the tables), there is some evidence that the 
Big Eight/Six share of the fraud-related audits dropped 
slightly over the time period examined in this study, 
which may be reflective of their efforts to retain fewer 
risky clients.
We also reviewed the auditor’s opinion on the last set 
of financial statements that were fraudulently mis­
stated to determine whether the auditor’s report con­
tained any modifications or qualifications. For the 
141 sample fraud companies where we were able to 
review the auditor’s report, we determined that 78 of 
those 141 audit reports (55 percent) contained unquali­
fied auditor opinions (“clean” opinions). The remain­
ing reports (45 percent) departed from the standard 
unqualified report for a variety of reasons (in some 
cases more than one reason caused the modification). 
Nineteen of the 141 audit reports (13 percent) con­
tained auditor reports that were modified or qualified 
due to going concern issues and eighteen (13 percent) 
were modified or qualified due to litigation or other 
uncertainties."7 An additional 15 of 141 audit reports 
(11 percent) were modified due to a change in ac­
counting principle and 20 (14 percent) were modi­
fied due to different auditors being involved with cur­
rent and prior year financial statements presented com­
paratively. Four of the 141 (three percent) audit re­
ports were modified due to GAAP departures, and 
only four of the 141 (three percent) audit reports in­
cluded disclaimers of opinion. See Table 15.
7The form of reporting for uncertainties changed as a result o f the issu­
ance of the expectation gap Statements on Auditing Standards in 1988. 
Thus, the form o f reporting (modifications versus qualifications) varied 
across the years involved.
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Table 15 -  Types of Auditor Reports on Last Fraud Financial Statements
Type of Auditor Report
Number of 
Reports by 
Type
Percentage of 
Audit Reports by 
Type
Unqualified Opinions 78 55%
Modified or Qualified Reports 
Going concern -  19 reports 
Litigation uncertainties -  9 reports 
Other uncertainties -  9 reports 
Change in accounting principle -  15 reports 
Change in auditor across
comparative reporting periods -  20 reports 
GAAP departures -  4 reports
59 42%
Note: The above do not sum to equal the 59 modified or qualified 
reports because some of the reports addressed more than one 
modification/qualification issue.
Disclaimers of Opinion 4 3%
Number of Auditor Reports Available for Review 141 100%
Table 1 6 - Types of Auditors Named in AAERs
Number of AAERs Number of AAERs Naming
Naming Big Eight/Six Non-Big Eight/Six
AAERs Name Auditor For Auditors Auditors
Apparent Involvement (n=30) 1 29
Substandard Audit (n=26) 9 11
Total Number of AAERs
Naming Auditor 10 46
Alleged Auditor Involvement in the Fraud
In 29 percent of the cases (56 of 195 cases), the exter­
nal auditor was named in an AAER. Out of the 56 
cases where the auditor was named, the auditor was 
charged in 30 cases with either violating Rule 10(b)- 
5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or charged with 
aiding and abetting others in a violation of Rule 10(b)-
5. Of those 30 cases, 29 involved non-Big Eight/Six 
auditors with only one involving a Big Eight/Six au­
ditor.
In the remaining 26 of 56 cases where the auditor was 
named, the auditor was accused of performing a sub­
standard audit. Out of these 26 cases, 17 involved 
non-Big Eight/Six auditors and nine involved Big 
Eight/Six auditors. See Table 16.
The external auditor was named in an AAER 
for 29 percent of the sample companies. Most 
of those auditors named were non-Big Eight/ 
Six auditors.
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Auditor Changes During Fraud Period
We gathered data to be able to compare the name of 
the auditor associated with the last fraudulent finan­
cial statements to the name of the auditor who issued 
an audit report on the last clean financial statements. 
We were able to make that comparison for 88 sample 
fraud companies. We found that 23 (26 percent) of 
the 88 companies changed auditors between the pe­
riod that the company issued the last clean financial 
statements and the period the company issued the last 
set of fraudulent financial statements. Of those switch­
ing auditors, one company switched from one Big 
Eight/Six firm to another Big Eight/Six firm, four 
switched from a Big Eight/Six firm to a non-Big Eight/ 
Six firm, six switched from a non-Big Eight/Six firm 
to a Big Eight/Six firm, and 12 switched between non- 
Big Eight/Six firms. We also reviewed the timing of 
the auditor switch and found that just over half of 
those companies changed auditors during the fraud 
period (e.g., two audit firms were associated with the 
fraud period). Nine companies changed auditors at 
the end of the last clean financial statement period 
(e.g., just before the fraud period began).
Most auditor switches occurred during the 
fraud period (versus before the fraud period) 
and most involved changes among non-Big 
Eight/Six audit firms.
in that time frame for 167 of the 204 sample compa­
nies.8
We identified 73 (36 percent) of the 204 sample com­
panies that either filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, were 
described as “defunct” in the AAER, or were taken 
over by a state or federal regulator after the fraud oc­
curred. We also found that an additional 31 compa­
nies (15 percent) either sold a large portion of their 
assets (six companies), merged with another company 
(15 companies), or had a new controlling shareholder 
(10 companies) following the occurrence of the fi­
nancial statement fraud. Thus, approximately 50 per­
cent of the companies were no longer in existence or 
were under a substantially different form of owner­
ship and existence following the fraud period. We 
identified 42 companies (21 percent) whose stock was 
delisted from the national stock exchange where the 
stock was traded. See Table 17.
Thirty-six percent of the sample companies went 
bankrupt/defunct or were taken over by a regu­
lator. Twenty-one percent were delisted by a 
national stock exchange.
Consequences for the Company and 
Individuals Involved
8Frequencies of consequences reported in this section are inherently un­
derstated given that we were only able to identify consequences explic­
itly noted in an AAER or in business press articles. Given that the busi­
ness press often does not cover smaller or otherwise less visible compa­
nies, there are likely to be many consequences that occurred that we 
were unable to identify for our sample firms (which tend to be relatively 
small).
Consequences for the Company
We attempted to identify consequences for compa­
nies that resulted from the commission of the finan­
cial statement fraud. First, we noted consequences 
described in the AAERs for each of the 204 sample 
companies. Then, we performed extensive searches 
of electronic databases of business press articles writ­
ten during the period from the date of the last fraudu­
lent financial statement through two years after the 
SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud. We 
were able to locate business press articles appearing
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Table 17 -  Status of Companies After Fraud Disclosed
Percentage of
Number of Sample Sample
Companies Companies
Company Status Subsequent to the Fraud Affected Affected
Bankrupt, defunct 73 36%
Changed ownership
Sold large portion of assets 6 3%
- Merged with another company 15 1%
Experienced change in controlling shareholders 10 5%
Total 31 15%
Delisted from national stock exchange 42 21%
Financial and Other Consequences to 
Companies and Individuals Involved
In addition to the injunctions and disgorgements fre­
quently associated with SEC actions, we also tried to 
identify other consequences for companies and indi­
viduals. We found 49 companies (24 percent) that 
were sued and/or settled with shareholders or bond­
holders, generally as a part of class action lawsuits 
filed subsequent to the disclosure of the fraud.9 We 
identified the amount of fines and settlements paid 
by the company for 30 of these 49 companies. The 
cumulative amount of fines and settlements paid by
all sample companies was $348 million. The average 
fine or settlement paid by a single company was $12 
million, and the median was $4 million. We also iden­
tified 35 companies whose senior executives paid fines 
related to actions taken by the SEC against them per­
sonally. The cumulative amount of fines paid by se­
nior executives of those 35 companies totaled $193 
million. The average fine paid by senior executives 
was $5.5 million, with a median fine of $456,000. To 
put these fines and settlements in perspective, the 
average cumulative misstatement reported earlier in 
Table 9 was $25 million with a median cumulative 
misstatement of $4.1 million. See Table 18.
9This finding is lower than the finding of 58 percent reported in the study 
conducted by Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998). Our result is likely 
understated given it is based on our extensive search of business publica­
tions, while the Bonner et al. result is based on analysis o f litigation 
databases, which are not necessarily readily available in public sources. 
See Section VI for more discussion about the Bonner et al. study.
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Table 18 -  Fines and Settlements
Description of 
Fine
Number of 
Companies 
Identified
Cumulative 
Fine/Settlement 
Paid by All 
Companies
Mean Fine/ 
Settlement 
Paid by a 
Single 
Company
Median Fine/ 
Settlement 
Paid by a 
Single 
Company
Fines and settlements 
paid by the company
30 $348 million $12 million $4 million
Fines and settlements 
paid by senior executives 
related to SEC actions
35 $193 million $5.5 million $456,000
Table 19 -  Other Consequences to Executives and Companies
Number of Percentage of
Companies Companies
Description of Outcome
Resignations or terminations of
Affected Affected
- CEO or president 76 37%
- CFO or controller 47 23%
- COO or another senior executive 32 16%
Senior executive(s) barred from service as 
officer or director of another SEC 
registrant for period of time
54 26%
Company executives criminally prosecuted 
for fraud
31 15%
In addition to direct financial penalties, senior execu­
tives were penalized in other ways as highlighted in 
Table 19. We identified 76 companies (37 percent) 
whose CEO or president was forced to resign or was 
terminated as a result of the fraud. We found that 47 
companies (23 percent) terminated or forced the CFO 
or controller to resign and 32 companies (16 percent) 
experienced the termination or resignation of the COO 
or another senior executive as a result of the fraud. 
Again, the frequencies of resignations and termina­
tions are likely understated given the lack of consis­
tent reporting of such events in the business press for 
all sample companies. Senior executives of 54 com­
panies (26 percent) were barred for a period of time, 
and in some cases permanently, from serving as an 
officer or director of another registrant of the SEC. 
Thirty-one companies’ executives (15 percent) were 
criminally prosecuted for the financial statement fraud. 
We identified 27 senior executives who were jailed 
as a result of their involvement in the fraud.
The business press reported stock price declines fol­
lowing the public announcement of the fraud for 20 
of the sample companies. For those 20 companies, 
the stock price dropped an average of 58 percent fol­
lowing the public disclosure of the fraud.
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SECTION IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
One of the objectives of this study is to evaluate the 
findings for implications regarding the corporate fi­
nancial reporting process. This section highlights 
several implications developed by the research team 
based on the descriptive analysis of characteristics 
associated with the 204 sample fraud companies ex­
amined in this study.
Our attempt to draw implications from the findings 
in this study is designed to assist others in the identi­
fication of potential improvements to the existing fi­
nancial reporting system. In doing so, we recognize 
that the presence of financial statement fraud is rela­
tively infrequent, making the task of fraud detection 
extremely difficult. We acknowledge the tremendous 
benefit of hindsight evaluation of known cases of fi­
nancial statement fraud as we present these implica­
tions. Furthermore, some of the implications reflect 
our judgments and opinions that developed from the 
extensive analysis of the sample cases. In any event, 
hopefully the implications noted in this section will 
spawn useful consideration of changes that can pro­
mote higher quality financial reporting.
Implications Related to the Nature of 
Companies Involved
Strained Resources of Smaller Companies 
Pinch Internal Controls
Because fraud companies were relatively small (gen­
erally less than $100 million in assets) when com­
pared to many publicly traded companies in the U.S., 
many of these companies may be unable or unwilling 
to implement effective internal controls, particularly 
adequate segregation of key duties. The lack of ideal 
internal control may create opportunities for senior 
management to override existing controls. In addi­
tion, smaller companies may be unable or even un­
willing to employ executives with expertise in finan­
cial reporting processes, particularly those individu­
als knowledgeable of the legal requirements for pub­
licly traded companies. Thus, boards of directors, 
audit committees, and external and internal auditors 
may need to closely examine the effects of these types 
of resource constraints on the likelihood of financial 
statement improprieties for the entities they serve.
Some companies may not be able to cost ef­
fectively justify effective internal controls due 
to their size. Other companies may be unwill­
ing to invest necessary resources to imple­
ment strong controls.
Small Size of Fraud Companies Has 
Implications for Regulators and Exchanges
In certain cases, companies below a certain size thresh­
old are exempted from many of the listing require­
ments of the national stock exchanges and other regu­
lations, for valid reasons (primarily cost concerns). 
As an example, many of the recommendations con­
tained in the Report and Recommendations of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness o f 
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC, 1999) explicitly 
exempt smaller companies (e.g., market capitalization 
of $200 million or below). As a result, certain regu­
latory provisions may fail to target companies with 
an increased likelihood for financial statement fraud. 
The national stock exchanges and regulators should 
carefully evaluate the trade-offs of designing policies 
that occasionally exempt small companies.
Certain regulatory provisions may exempt 
companies with an increased likelihood for 
financial statement fraud.
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Going Concern Needs Close Monitoring
Pressures for survival and pressures to meet earnings 
expectations can create obvious strains on senior ex­
ecutives. Given that many of the sample fraud com­
panies were in a net loss position or were on the brink 
of a net loss position in periods leading up to the fraud 
period, boards of directors, audit committees, and both 
internal and external auditors may want to develop 
systems or procedures for regularly monitoring these 
financial pressures, particularly as financial health 
appears to be deteriorating.
The presence of financial distress for some compa­
nies in periods before the alleged fraud period high­
lights the importance of effective monitoring of go­
ing concern. Given observations of auditor changes 
during the fraud period, close screening of going con­
cern indicators and effective communications with 
predecessor auditors when evaluating potentially new 
clients are particularly important.
The financial stress of many fraud companies 
highlights the importance of effective moni­
toring of going concern.
Implications Related to the Nature of 
the Control Environment (Top Manage­
ment and the Board)
Thorough Assessments of Top Management 
Pressures and Integrity Warranted
The overwhelming percentage of senior executives 
named in the AAERs highlights the importance of a 
detailed and continuous analysis of issues affecting 
the organization’s control environment (e.g., the “tone 
at the top”), as emphasized in COSO’s Internal Con­
trol -  Integrated Framework (COSO, 1992). The fre­
quency of CEO and CFO involvement highlights the 
importance of assessing key performance pressures 
faced by senior executives. Boards of directors and 
audit committees need to consider the potential for 
these pressures when designing executive compensa­
tion plans for their key executives. Board of director
and audit committee members need to exercise pro­
fessional skepticism when evaluating top management 
actions. Boards and audit committees may also look 
for pressures from outside the organization for meet­
ing key company performance targets. Monitoring 
perceived pressures from the investment community 
to meet stated performance expectations, for example, 
may be warranted for boards, audit committees, and 
auditors.
Boards of directors, audit committee mem­
bers, and auditors need to consider the po­
tential for pressures on management result­
ing from compensation plans and expecta­
tions from the investment community.
The involvement of senior executives, such as the 
CEO, CFO, and COO, highlights the importance of 
effective monitoring by boards and audit committees 
of opportunities and incentives for management over­
ride of existing policies and procedures. Not only 
does financial statement fraud occur because of the 
presence of opportunities for override, but fraud also 
exists because there are managers who are willing to 
manipulate information inappropriately. The fact that 
misstatements are generated by executives willing to 
act inappropriately highlights the importance of ef­
fective screening of the integrity and reputations of 
potential executives.
Auditors also benefit from extensive consideration of 
the integrity and attitudes toward financial reporting 
of senior executives, particularly as auditors evaluate 
risks associated with a potential new client. Effec­
tive pre-engagement screening of potential risks, par­
ticularly the impact of management’s integrity and 
ethical values, may lead to better considerations of 
overall audit risk, particularly the risk of financial 
statement fraud. Routine performance of private in­
vestigations of the potential new client’s management 
team may warrant special consideration by auditors 
to help them obtain an evaluation of these engage­
ment factors.
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Employment decisions and client acceptance 
procedures may need to involve explicit con­
sideration of the integrity and ethical reputa­
tions of senior executives.
The frequency of non-accountant executives’ (e.g., 
CEOs and COOs) involvement in financial statement 
fraud may be in part due to a lack of understanding of 
the severity of the consequences of violating finan­
cial reporting requirements, particularly legal statutes 
applicable to financial reporting matters for publicly 
traded companies. Their involvement highlights the 
importance of effective education of CEOs and COOs 
in basic financial reporting requirements. Their in­
volvement also highlights the need for the participa­
tion of other qualified individuals in financial report­
ing processes. The involvement of individuals with 
financial reporting expertise, such as controllers, gen­
eral counsels, internal and external auditors, may help 
to educate non-accountant executives who are less 
familiar with the requirements of financial reporting 
in publicly traded companies. The involvement of 
knowledgeable individuals may also help restrain se­
nior executives who continue to be overly aggressive 
in financial reporting matters. Board members and 
auditors should also be alert for managers who use 
their knowledge of financial reporting matters to cover 
a fraud.
Involvement of individuals knowledgeable of 
financial reporting issues can help educate 
other less knowledgeable senior executives 
about risks associated with financial report­
ing.
Audit Committee Diligence is Critical for 
Companies of All Sizes
The analysis of proxy data indicated that most of the 
fraud companies either had no audit committee or had 
one that met less than twice per year. In such an envi­
ronment, the external auditors may have had little 
support or oversight from the board, and company 
executives may have been in a better position to com­
mit fraud. In the absence of an effective audit com­
mittee, typical audit committee functions such as fi­
nancial oversight, risk analysis, and assessment of 
management integrity may suffer.
The concentration of fraud among companies with 
under $50 million in revenues and with generally weak 
audit committees highlights the importance of ques­
tioning whether more rigorous audit committee prac­
tices should be followed by smaller organizations. In 
particular, the number of audit committee meetings 
per year and the financial expertise of audit commit­
tee members may deserve closer attention. Audit com­
mittees meeting less than twice per year or those com­
posed of non-experts may have no reasonable chance 
of functioning effectively.
The audit committee’s effectiveness also is restricted 
by the quality and extent of information it receives. 
To perform effective monitoring, the audit commit­
tee needs access to reliable financial and nonfinan­
cial information, industry and other external 
benchmarking data, and other comparative informa­
tion that is prepared on a consistent basis. Boards 
and audit committees should work to obtain from se­
nior management and other information providers rel­
evant and reliable data to assist them in the financial 
reporting monitoring process.
Board Independence and Expertise are 
Important for Companies of all Sizes
The proxy analysis suggested that the fraud compa­
nies’ boards generally were neither independent 
(dominated by insiders and gray directors) nor expert 
(little if any board experience elsewhere). A board’s 
effective monitoring of management relies on inde­
pendent experts devoting sufficient time and energy 
to their task. If the directors are neither independent 
nor expert, the board may have no reasonable chance 
of functioning as a vigorous monitor of management.
While the small size of many of the fraud companies 
likely accounts for the apparent lack of director inde­
pendence and expertise, it is important to consider 
whether smaller organizations should focus more 
heavily on director independence and expertise. In 
the smaller company setting, due to the centralization
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of power in a few individuals, it may be especially 
important to have a solid monitoring function per­
formed by the board.
Relationships and Personal Factors May 
Increase Risk
The proxy analysis provided evidence of various re­
lationships and personal factors that may indicate 
greater risk. Investors should be aware of the pos­
sible complications arising from family relationships 
and from individuals (founders, CEO/board chairs, 
etc.) who hold significant power or incompatible job 
functions. Due to the size and nature of the sample 
companies, the existence of such relationships and 
personal factors is to be expected. It is important to 
recognize that such conditions present both benefits 
and costs.
Implications Related to Nature of 
Frauds
Close Scrutiny Over Interim Financial 
Reporting
From our readings of the AAERs, we observed that 
many frauds allegedly were initiated in a quarterly 
Form 10-Q, with the first manipulation sometimes at 
relatively small amounts. After observing that the 
fraud was undetected in initial attempts, the fraud 
scheme was repeated in subsequently issued quarterly 
or annual financial statements, with the fraud amount 
often increasing over time and generally stretching 
over two fiscal years.
These observations highlight the importance of ac­
tive review of quarterly financial statements by audit 
committees and external auditors. Close scrutiny of 
quarterly financial information and a move toward 
continuous auditing strategies may increase opportu­
nities for earlier detection of financial statement im­
proprieties.
These observations also have implications for man­
agement and internal auditors who may want to ex­
amine existing processes and controls surrounding the 
preparation of interim financial statements. In par­
ticular, the presence of some financial statement frauds 
involving strictly interim periods suggests that pro­
cesses and controls related to interim reporting may 
be unduly less rigorous than those controls surround­
ing annual financial reporting.
Policies and procedures surrounding prepa­
ration of interim financial statements may 
need to be examined.
Procedures Needed for Revenue Recognition 
and Asset Valuation
The frequency of recording sales prematurely or fic­
titiously suggests the importance of both external and 
internal auditor consideration of existing company 
processes and controls designed to ensure compliance 
with revenue recognition principles. The recording 
of sales before customer order or customer shipment 
suggests a particular need for close examination by 
managers and auditors of evidence documenting sat­
isfaction of transaction terms, particularly for trans­
actions near period end. Focusing on the control en­
vironment, particularly an assessment of the likeli­
hood of management override, may provide useful 
insights as to the possibility for inappropriate account­
ing for revenue transactions.
In addition to focusing on processes and controls re­
lated to recording sales transactions, the misstatements 
due to improper cutoffs of sales transactions, over­
stated percentage of completion estimates, and sub­
sequent modifications to terms of sales through side 
agreements all highlight the benefits of properly ex­
ecuted tests of controls and substantive procedures 
that focus closely on end-of-the-period transactions. 
Procedures designed to evaluate transaction cutoff and 
to examine estimates generated by management may 
have an impact on identifying potential misstatements 
surrounding revenue recognition issues. Also, test­
ing to identify the presence of side agreements that 
modify transaction terms may need to be addressed 
with customers directly through confirmation proce­
dures. However, there were instances where confir­
mation recipients were participants in the fraud. Thus, 
sending confirmations may not always reduce audit
Section IV — Implications of the Study 35
risk to a desirable level. When the risk of potential 
fraud is assessed as high, auditors may want to con­
sider delaying the completion of the audit until suffi­
cient cash receipts have been received for the trans­
actions in question.
Misstatements due to asset overstatements also high­
light the importance of effective procedures surround­
ing valuation of asset accounts. Many of the asset 
overstatements involved manipulation of sensitive 
estimates of allowances for doubtful receivables and 
valuations of unusual assets such as patents, mineral 
reserves, and unique inventory and property, plant, 
and equipment items. Obtaining evidence to sub­
stantiate key judgments made by company managers 
in the valuation process may identify overly aggres­
sive and improper valuation techniques employed. In 
addition, the identification of misstatements due to 
the recording of fictitious assets highlights the im­
portance of substantive testing techniques, particu­
larly physical examination, to ensure compliance with 
the existence assertion.
Findings suggest a continued need for evalu­
ating and testing controls related to record­
ing key end-of-period accounts and transac­
tions and the importance of the design and 
performance of effective substantive proce­
dures in light of the knowledge obtained about 
internal controls.
senior management. Auditors should recognize the 
potential for greater audit risk when auditing compa­
nies with weak board and audit committee governance. 
As auditors approach the audit, information from a 
variety of sources should be considered to establish 
an appropriate level of professional skepticism needed 
for each engagement.
Auditors need to look beyond the financial 
statements to understand risks associated with 
the client’s industry, management’s financial 
reporting incentives, and internal control, with 
particular emphasis on the strength of board 
and audit committee governance.
Implications Regarding the Roles of 
External Auditors
The next section titled, “The Focus on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting,” is provided for those interested 
in gaining a perspective on the significant efforts since 
the issuance of the Treadway Commission’s 1987 re­
port by various organizations to address financial re­
porting problems. Numerous significant changes have 
been implemented throughout the 1990s affecting 
various parties in the financial reporting process. 
Section V summarizes these actions. In addition to 
these efforts, academic research has been conducted 
to better understand issues affecting fraudulent finan­
cial reporting instances. Section VI titled, “Overview 
of Findings from Academic Research,” contains a 
summary of findings from research that provides ad­
ditional insights to those interested in improving cor­
porate financial statement reporting.
The collective implications about the nature of the 
companies involved, the role of the control environ­
ment, and specific characteristics of the fraud sug­
gest the need for the auditor to look beyond the finan­
cial statements to understand risks unique to the 
client’s industry, management’s motivation toward 
aggressive reporting, and client internal control, 
among other matters. In particular, auditors may ben­
efit greatly by focusing closely on the control envi­
ronment, starting with the board and audit committee 
and including an extensive assessment of the integ­
rity and financial reporting knowledge and ability of
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SECTION V 
THE FOCUS ON FRAUDULENT 
FINANCIAL REPORTING
In October 1987, the National Commission on Fraudu­
lent Financial Reporting issued a landmark report 
titled, Report o f the National Commission on Fraudu­
lent Financial Reporting, in response to a major ef­
fort to highlight concerns about fraudulent financial 
reporting (NCFFR, 1987). It had a major impact in 
refocusing the business community on the problem 
of fraudulent financial reporting and provided a sig­
nificant update as to the problem of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting throughout much of the 1980s. Earlier 
efforts such as The Commission on Auditor’s Respon­
sibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
(commonly referred to as the Cohen Commission 
Report) issued in 1978 previously highlighted the 
growing gap between auditor performance and finan­
cial statement user expectations. In particular, the 
Cohen Commission’s Report primarily targeted the 
development of conclusions and recommendations 
regarding the appropriate responsibilities of indepen­
dent auditors, including the auditor’s responsibility 
for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting 
(AICPA Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 
1978).
While not only serving as an update to earlier reports 
such as the Cohen Commission’s Report, the 
Treadway Commission’s study of incidents of finan­
cial statement fraud focused on a broader range of 
parties playing a vital role in the financial reporting 
process. Given that consequences of fraud, while in­
frequent, can be widespread, the report expanded be­
yond a focus on auditor responsibilities and included 
49 extensive recommendations that embraced the roles 
of top management and boards of directors of public 
companies, independent public accountants and the 
public accounting profession, the SEC and other regu­
latory and law enforcement bodies, and the academic 
community. The Treadway Commission’s report de­
veloped many of its recommendations based on the 
Commission’s identification of numerous causal fac­
tors that can lead to financial statement fraud, which 
are described in the Treadway Commission’s report.
Throughout the 1990s there have been numer­
ous efforts designed to improve the effective­
ness of auditors, managers, boards of direc­
tors, and audit committees in preventing fi­
nancial statement fraud.
In the decade following the issuance of the Report of 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting, there have been numerous efforts build­
ing upon the Treadway Commission’s findings de­
signed to minimize incidents of fraudulent financial 
reporting. These efforts have particularly focused on 
the roles auditors, managers, boards of directors, and 
audit committees play in the financial reporting pro­
cess.
Efforts Related to the Role of Auditors
The independent auditor of financial statements plays 
a vital role in the detection of (material) fraudulent 
financial reporting. The investing public and credi­
tors look to the independent audit process to gain as­
surance and confidence in the reliability of financial 
statements they rely upon to make significant busi­
ness decisions. Numerous efforts have been made by 
the auditing profession to improve its performance in 
the detection of material misstatements in financial 
statements due to fraud. Several of those efforts have 
originated since the issuance of the Treadway 
Commission’s 1987 report.
SAS No. 53. Soon after the issuance of the Treadway 
Commission’s report, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) issued Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and
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Report Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, 1988). The 
ASB issued SAS No. 53 to strengthen the auditor’s 
responsibility related to the detection of instances of 
material fraudulent financial reporting. SAS No. 53 
modified the auditor’s responsibility to require the 
auditor to “design the audit to provide reasonable as­
surance of detecting errors and irregularities.” SAS 
No. 53 was designed to narrow the expectation gap 
between the assurances auditors provide and what fi­
nancial statement users expect regarding the detec­
tion of fraudulent financial reporting. SAS No. 53 
required the auditor to provide reasonable assurance 
that material irregularities would be detected, which 
extended the auditor’s responsibility beyond what was 
required by SAS No. 53’s predecessor — SAS No. 
16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the 
Detection of Errors and Irregularities.
Public Oversight Board’s 1993 Special Report.
Subsequent to the issuance of SAS No. 53, the Public 
Oversight Board of the AICPA SEC Practice Section 
(the POB) issued in March 1993 a Special Report 
titled, In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the 
Accounting Profession (AICPA POB, 1993). That 
report was primarily in response to continuing signs 
of failing public confidence in public accountants and 
auditors, particularly the widespread belief that audi­
tors have a responsibility for detecting management 
fraud which many viewed auditors as not meeting. 
Based on the POB’s belief that the integrity and reli­
ability of audited financial statements are critical to 
the U.S. economy, the POB’s Special Report con­
tained, among others, specific recommendations for 
improving and strengthening the accounting 
profession’s performance by enhancing its capacity 
and willingness to detect fraud and improve the fi­
nancial reporting process. The POB’s Special Report 
called for improved guidance beyond that in SAS No. 
53 to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood of 
fraud, a strengthening of the process to ensure audi­
tor independence and professionalism, and changes 
in the corporate governance process. The POB made 
several recommendations directed at putting in place 
mechanisms to analyze audit failures in order to fer­
ret out their causes, the symptoms related to those 
causes, and the actions that might be taken to avoid 
their recurrence. The POB was especially interested
in enhancing the auditing profession’s potential for 
detecting management fraud.
AICPA Board of Directors’ 1993 Report. Also in 
1993, the AICPA’s Board of Directors issued its re­
port, Meeting the Financial Reporting Needs of the 
Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Ac­
counting Profession (AICPA Board of Directors, 
1993). In that report, the AICPA Board of Directors 
expressed its determination to keep the United States’ 
financial reporting system the best in the world, sup­
ported the recommendations and initiatives of others 
to assist auditors in the detection of material misstate­
ments in financial statements resulting from fraud, and 
encouraged every participant in the financial report­
ing process — management, their advisors, regula­
tors, and independent auditors — to share in this re­
sponsibility.
“Decisive action is needed to bolster the pub­
lic trust by strengthening the financial report­
ing system to meet the needs of the future. ”
— Jake Netterville, 
AICPA Chairman, June 8, 1993
AICPA SEC Practice Section Initiatives. Soon af­
ter the issuance of the POB’s Special Report and the 
AICPA’s Board of Directors’ report, the AICPA un­
dertook efforts related to improving the financial re­
porting process particularly through improved detec­
tion of fraudulent financial reporting. The AICPA’s 
SEC Practice Section formed a Professional Issues 
Task Force that has since its creation published guid­
ance about emerging or unresolved practice issues that 
surface through litigation analysis, peer review, or in­
ternal inspection. The SEC Practice Section also 
amended membership requirements to require that 
concurring partners provide assurance that those con­
sulted on accounting and auditing matters are aware 
of all relevant facts and circumstances related to the 
consultation issue and to the auditee, to ensure that 
the conclusion reached is an appropriate one. Addi­
tionally, the AICPA SEC Practice Section created the 
Detection and Prevention of Fraud Task Force. That 
task force issued a document in 1994 titled. Client
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Acceptance and Continuance Procedures for Audit 
Clients. That document emphasized that understand­
ing the components of engagement risk is critical to 
deciding whether to accept new clients, continue old 
ones, and in any event to manage the “audit risk” that 
accompanies those decisions. Related to these issues, 
the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board ultimately is­
sued in 1997 revised professional standards to pro­
vide guidance designed to improve understandings 
between client management and auditors (SAS No.
83, Establishing an Understanding With the Client, 
AICPA 1997b) and to improve communications be­
tween successor and predecessor auditors (SAS No.
84, Communications Between Predecessor and Suc­
cessor Auditors, AICPA 1997c).
New Fraud Standard: SAS No. 82. With regard to 
auditing professional standards specifically related to 
the auditor’s detection of material misstatements due 
to fraudulent financial reporting, the POB’s 1993 Spe­
cial Report highlighted that “Attacks on the account­
ing profession from a variety of sources suggested a 
significant public concern with the profession’s per­
formance. Of particular moment is the widespread 
belief that auditors have a responsibility for detecting 
management fraud which they are not now meeting” 
(AICPA POB, 1993, p. 1). That report called for the 
development of guidelines to assist auditors in assess­
ing the likelihood of financial statement fraud and to 
specify additional auditing procedures when there is 
a heightened likelihood of management fraud. Even 
before the POB’s Special Report recommendation for 
improved auditor guidance was issued, the AICPA had 
already convened a conference in 1992 of educators 
and practitioners, known as the Expectation Gap 
Roundtable, that also raised questions concerning 
whether SAS No. 53 had been successful in narrow­
ing the expectation gap relating to the detection of 
material misstatements in financial statements result­
ing from fraud (AICPA, 1993).
Thus, in 1997 the AICPA responded to these calls for 
improved auditing guidance related to the detection 
of material misstatements due to fraudulent financial 
reporting by issuing SAS No. 82, Consideration o f 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 1997a). 
SAS No. 82 superseded guidance in SAS No. 53 in 
an effort to enhance auditor performance. The
auditor’s responsibility to plan and perform the audit 
to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the fi­
nancial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether due to error or fraud, did not change from 
the SAS No. 53 detection responsibility. However, 
SAS No. 82 clarified the auditor’s responsibility to 
detect material misstatements resulting from fraudu­
lent financial reporting, changed the auditor’s risk 
assessment process to require documentation of the 
auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud, and provided expanded operational 
guidance to assist auditors in meeting their already 
existing responsibility for the detection of material 
misstatements due to fraud.
In particular, SAS No. 82 significantly expanded the 
identification of risk factors known to be commonly 
linked to instances of fraudulent financial reporting. 
The ASB expanded the identification of risk factors 
beyond those in SAS No. 53 based on its belief that 
the most effective method to assess the risk of mate­
rial misstatement due to fraud is to consider whether 
risk factors that might indicate the existence of fraud 
are present. SAS No. 82 expanded guidance designed 
to assist the auditor in developing the appropriate re­
sponse to the presence of such risk factors. In addi­
tion to providing expanded operational guidance to 
assist auditors in the assessment of the potential for 
fraudulent financial reporting, SAS No. 82 also re­
vised the authoritative literature relating to the con­
cepts of due professional care, professional skepti­
cism, and obtaining reasonable assurance.
ASB’s Call for Research. While it is the ASB’s hope 
that SAS No. 82 leads to improved detection of mate­
rial misstatements due to fraud, the AICPA is com­
mitted to evaluating how well SAS No. 82 is meeting 
the ASB’s objectives. This commitment was estab­
lished in the exposure draft of SAS No. 82 whereby 
the ASB noted that it will “develop a process to ob­
tain feedback on the new standard periodically to as­
sess how well it is accomplishing its objectives and 
to identify further steps that need to be taken. This 
feedback process should be helpful in defining fur­
ther research on fraud deterrence and detection.” 
Accordingly, in October 1998 the AICPA issued a 
Request for Research Proposals for an Assessment of 
SAS No. 82 (AICPA, 1998). The ASB is currently
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seeking research relevant to two broad objectives. The 
first objective is to provide research to assist the ASB 
in its assessment of the effectiveness of SAS No. 82. 
The second objective is to provide research to assist 
the ASB in its efforts to continually improve SAS No. 
82 related guidance by addressing how emerging busi­
ness and technology trends affect the process of de­
tecting material misstatements due to fraud.
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) is com­
mitted to developing a process to obtain feed­
back on the new standard periodically to as­
sess how well it is accomplishing its objec­
tives and to identify further steps that need to 
be taken.
- ASB’s Request for Proposal, 
October 1998
This report. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-
1997, contains findings that should provide timely and 
relevant information to assist the ASB in this effort. 
Specifically, the ASB is interested in gathering infor­
mation to assist them in evaluating how complete and 
discriminating are the fraud risk factors in SAS No. 
82. This study, which contains an extensive descrip­
tion of instances of fraudulent financial reporting ad­
dressed by AAERs issued during 1987-1997, should 
be useful to the ASB in evaluating SAS No. 82.
In addition to these changes in professional standards, 
other efforts have occurred that relate to auditors. For 
example, in 1988 the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners was established. This professional orga­
nization is dedicated to educating qualified individu­
als who are trained in the aspects of detecting, inves­
tigating, and deterring fraud and white-collar crime.
nancial statement for which the auditor has been held 
responsible was prepared by executives who were 
intentionally misstating financial information to de­
ceive not only shareholders, investors, and creditors, 
but the auditor as well. Thus, the Treadway 
Commission’s report contained numerous recommen­
dations for public companies, particularly addressing 
responsibilities of top management, the board of di­
rectors, and the audit committee. In particular, the 
Treadway Commission’s report called for all public 
companies to maintain internal controls that provide 
reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial report­
ing will be prevented or subject to early detection. 
To assist senior management and others, the Treadway 
Commission specifically called for the development 
of additional, integrated guidance on internal controls.
COSO’s 1992 Report. In 1992, COSO issued Inter­
nal Control -  Integrated Framework (hereinafter re­
ferred to as the COSO Report) in response to calls for 
better internal control systems to help senior execu­
tives better control the enterprises they run (COSO, 
1992). In addition to noting that internal control can 
help an entity achieve its performance and profitabil­
ity targets and prevent the loss of resources, the COSO 
Report also noted that internal control can significantly 
help an entity ensure reliable financial reporting. The 
COSO Report:
• Provided a high-level overview of the inter­
nal control framework directed to the chief 
executive and other senior officers, board 
members, legislators, and regulators,
• Defined internal control, described its com­
ponents and provided criteria against which 
managements, boards of directors, and oth­
ers can assess their internal control systems.
Efforts Related to the Roles of Management, 
Boards of Directors, and Audit Committees
While auditors play a vital role in the detection of 
instances of material fraudulent financial reporting, 
the Treadway Commission’s 1987 report noted that 
the prevention and early detection of fraudulent fi­
nancial reporting must start with the entity that pre­
pares the financial statements. Every fraudulent fi­
• Provided guidance to those entities that re­
port publicly on internal control over the 
preparation of their published statements, and
• Contained materials that might be useful in 
conducting an evaluation of internal controls.
The issuance of the COSO Report provided a com­
mon framework for designing and implementing in­
ternal controls and is becoming widely accepted as
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the benchmark for evaluating internal controls for 
businesses and other entities — in the public or pri­
vate sector, large or small, for profit or not. It is 
COSO’s hope that effective implementations by se­
nior executives of such a framework would lead to 
improved financial reporting in the U.S., including a 
reduction in the incidence of fraudulent financial re­
porting.
Ultimately, however, the responsibility for establish­
ing an effective system of internal control rests with 
the board of directors. Shareholders delegate primary 
responsibility for the integrity of management and the 
financial statement reporting process to boards of di­
rectors. The COSO Report noted that a strong and 
active board, particularly when coupled with effec­
tive upward communications channels and capable 
financial, legal, and internal audit functions, is often 
best able to identify and correct internal control weak­
nesses that enable a dishonest management to inten­
tionally misrepresent financial results and cover its 
tracks.
Audit Committee Requirements of Major U.S. 
Stock Exchanges. Often the board assigns responsi­
bility for oversight of the financial reporting process 
to an audit committee. In the U.S., all three major 
securities markets — the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation System (NASDAQ) — have requirements 
addressing audit committee composition. The NYSE 
requires (and the AMEX recommends) that listed 
companies have audit committees made up entirely 
of outside directors. NASDAQ only requires that a 
majority of the audit committee consist of outside 
directors for companies trading on the National and 
Small Cap Markets. These audit committee require­
ments were generally in place by the time the 
Treadway Commission’s report was issued.1 How­
ever, other regulatory actions were undertaken in the 
1990s related to the corporate governance process. 
For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora­
tion implemented new audit committee composition 
requirements mandating the inclusion of independent
directors who, for certain large depository institutions, 
must include individuals with banking experience.
The Institute of Internal Auditors’ Study on Au­
dit Committee Effectiveness. Several highly publi­
cized financial reporting frauds have led to questions 
regarding how effectively boards and audit commit­
tees oversee the financial reporting process. For ex­
ample, the New York Times reported that following 
an occurrence of material fraudulent financial report­
ing, the Leslie Fay Company announced the election 
of two additional outside members “to give its board 
a more independent character” (New York Times, April 
30, 1993). As a result, throughout the 1990s there 
have been numerous calls for strengthening the ef­
fectiveness of the corporate governance function per­
formed by boards of directors and audit committees.
To gain insight into the roles of audit committees in 
the corporate governance process. The Institute of 
Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIA RF) is­
sued a 1993 report, Improving Audit Committee Per­
formance: What Works Best, that summarized a study 
conducted by Price Waterhouse on behalf of The IIA 
to determine current practices of audit committees and 
to gain insight as to how audit committees are likely 
to evolve (IIA RF, 1993). The purpose of The IIA 
report was to identify organizational and operational 
characteristics that not only describe how audit com­
mittees function, but how they function effectively. 
That report noted that the single most important find­
ing and the key to audit committee effectiveness is 
that audit committee members must be provided with 
more background information and training to enable 
them to be more effective. The report noted that au­
dit committee members can be effective only if they 
thoroughly understand their responsibilities and how 
to meet them effectively.
1The audit committee requirements for the NASDAQ Small Cap Market 
did not become effective until 1997.
“Audit committee members must be provided 
with more background and training to enable 
them to be more effective. ”
— Improving Audit Committee 
Performance: What Works Best, 
By Price Waterhouse, commissioned by 
The Institute of Internal Auditors 
Research Foundation
42 Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997
Public Oversight Board’s Advisory Panel Report.
Following the issuance of The IIA’s report, an Advi­
sory Panel on Auditor Independence provided a re­
port in 1994 to the FOB titled, Strengthening the Pro­
fessionalism of the Independent Auditor (AICPA POB, 
1994b). The Advisory Panel’s report highlighted that 
“over the past decade the dominance of the process 
of corporate governance by management [emphasis 
added] has ebbed as boards of directors have assumed 
the long-acknowledged but seldom-practiced role as 
the ‘fulcrum of accountability’ in the corporate gov­
ernance system” (AICPA POB, 1994b, p. 12). The 
Advisory Panel’s 1994 report summarized the view 
of many corporate governance experts that corporate 
governance in the U.S. is not functioning as designed 
primarily because too many boards of directors fail 
to make the system work the way it should. Lack of 
time, unwieldy board size, complexity of information, 
and lack of cohesiveness dilute boards’ effectiveness.
As a result of these views, the Advisory Panel en­
couraged boards of directors to play an active role in 
the financial reporting process and for the auditing 
profession to look to the board of directors — the 
shareholders’ representative — as its client. The 
Advisory Panel urged the POB and the SEC and oth­
ers to encourage adoption of proposals such as in­
creasing the representation of outsiders on the board 
and reducing board size to strengthen the indepen­
dence of boards of directors and their accountability 
to shareholders. These recommendations were based 
on the Advisory Panel’s belief that stronger, more 
accountable boards will strengthen the professional­
ism of the outside auditor, enhance the value of the 
independent audit, and serve the investing public.
In addition to strengthening the role of the board of 
directors in the oversight of management, the Advi­
sory Panel recommended that audit committees should 
expect auditors to be more forthcoming in communi­
cating first with the audit committee and then with 
the full board to provide the auditor’s perspective of 
the company’s operations as well as the company’s 
financial reporting policies and practices. The Advi­
sory Panel noted that audit committees should expect 
to receive, and independent auditors should deliver 
forthright, candid, oral reports in a timely manner on 
the quality and not just the acceptability of a
company’s financial reporting. It was the Advisory 
Panel’s objective to give directors a better basis for 
understanding and influencing corporate practices, 
which in turn should create a supportive climate lead­
ing toward more credible financial reporting.
Public Oversight Board’s 1995 Report. The POB
stated in their 1995 publication, Directors, Manage­
ment, and Auditors: Allies in Protecting Shareholder 
Interests, that practices followed by well governed 
corporations should foster an environment where the 
independent auditor, management, audit committee 
and board of directors play interactive and timely roles 
in the financial reporting process (AICPA POB, 1995). 
Having top management and the external auditor in­
volved in extensive discussions of important finan­
cial reporting matters with the audit committee and 
in some cases the full board should enhance the cor­
porate governance process and ultimately increase the 
credibility of financial reporting in the U.S.
The Independence Standards Board. To help 
strengthen the role of the auditor as an independent 
assurer of credible financial information and a major 
source of information for the audit committee and 
board, the accounting profession and the SEC agreed 
in 1997 to establish a new private sector body — the 
Independence Standards Board (ISB) — to set inde­
pendence rules and guidance for auditors of public 
companies. Part of the motivation for creating the 
ISB was initially based on comments in January 1994 
by then SEC Chief Accountant Walter P. Schuetze 
where he expressed concern that “.. .auditors [are] not 
standing up to their clients on financial accounting 
and reporting issues when their clients take a position 
that is, at best, not supported in the accounting litera­
ture or, at worst, directly contrary to existing pro­
nouncements” (as quoted in AICPA POB, 1994a). 
Based on the significance of his comments and the 
importance of auditor independence as a cornerstone 
of the auditing profession, efforts were taken to 
strengthen auditor independence as a means designed 
to strengthen the overall financial reporting process.
Despite these numerous efforts to improve the corpo­
rate governance process, the roles of corporate boards 
and audit committees continue to be criticized. For 
example, a recent article in The Wall Street Journal
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stated that “Too many audit committees are turning 
out to be toothless tigers. This corporate board com­
mittee supposedly reviews management’s financial 
actions and controls, as well as keeps tabs on internal 
and outside auditors. But a flurry of accounting 
scandals...indicates that the audit panels in many 
cases aren’t doing their jobs” (Lublin and MacDonald, 
1998).
'‘Too many audit committees are turning out 
to be toothless tigers. ”
— The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1998
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effec­
tiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. In Feb­
ruary 1999, the Report and Recommendations o f the 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective­
ness of Audit Committees (BRC, 1999) was issued 
containing 10 recommendations designed to improve 
the effectiveness of audit committees. The report, pre­
pared on behalf of the New York Stock Exchange and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, con­
tains recommendations aimed at strengthening the 
independence of the audit committee and improving 
audit committee effectiveness by encouraging the in­
clusion of individuals who are financially literate, the 
development of formal written audit committee char­
ters, and public reporting by the audit committee. In 
addition, the recommendations also address mecha­
nisms for accountability among the audit committee, 
the outside auditors, and management.
Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees.
In addition, the National Association of Corporate 
Directors’ Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Com­
mittees is addressing audit committee effectiveness 
by taking a broad approach to identifying a number 
of issues that represent “best practices,” with a par­
ticular focus on audit committees of smaller compa­
nies. It anticipates releasing its report later in 1999.
Part of the scope of the study underlying this report 
titled, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, 
involved examining key characteristics associated 
with boards of directors, audit committees, and audi­
tors for the companies investigated by the SEC dur­
ing 1987-1997 for fraudulent financial reporting- This 
report contains summaries of many of those charac­
teristics in an effort to shed additional light on corpo­
rate governance factors that may affect the likelihood 
of fraudulent financial reporting.
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SECTION VI 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
The academic community has been actively involved 
in conducting empirical research on the problem of 
fraudulent financial reporting during the period 1987-
1998. Much of the motivation for such research can 
be attributed to the visibility of the problem gener­
ated by the release of the 1987 Treadway Commis­
sion Report, the issuance of SAS Nos. 53 and 82, and 
all the noted calls for improved fraud detection and 
prevention. While research on financial statement 
fraud existed prior to the late 1980s, that stream of 
research was in the early stages of development. This 
section highlights the results related to several of those 
research efforts.1
Descriptive Research About Fraud. Much of the 
research in the 1980s was primarily descriptive. That 
research focused heavily on identifying financial state­
ment and nonfinancial characteristics of companies 
experiencing fraud (see for example, Elliott and 
Willingham, 1980; Albrecht et al., 1982; Merchant, 
1987).2 That research provided some of the basis for 
many of the fraud risk indicators included in SAS No. 
53.
One of the limitations of prior research regarding fraud 
risk factors was the lack of a solid conceptual model 
describing the link between fraud risk factors and the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud. In addition, 
SAS No. 53 presented 21 factors that may contribute 
to the likelihood of either material errors or irregu­
larities. One of the criticisms of SAS No. 53 was that 
its framework did not distinguish between factors 
more applicable to errors rather than fraud. The lack 
of any conceptual model was believed to add to the 
difficulty auditors faced in attempting to assess the 
likelihood of material misstatements due to fraud when 
selected fraud risk factors were found to be present.
Fraud Risk Assessment Model. In response to that 
concern, a conceptual model was proposed by 
Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) that described the 
probability of material misstatement due to fraud as a 
function of three factors; (1) the degree to which 
conditions are such that a material management fraud 
could be committed, (2) the degree to which the per­
son or persons of authority and responsibility in the 
entity have a reason or motivation to commit man­
agement fraud, and (3) the degree to which persons in 
positions of authority and responsibility in the entity 
have an attitude or set of ethical values such that they 
would allow themselves to commit management fraud.
This conceptual model was first validated by 
Loebbecke et al. (1989). They surveyed partners in a 
Big Eight audit firm about characteristics surround­
ing audit engagements where material irregularities 
were found to be present. They found that fraud risk 
factors consistent with the conceptual fraud assess­
ment model were present in a large portion of the cases 
involving material irregularities. One of their primary 
conclusions was that the fraud assessment model in­
corporated a reasoning process, rather than a check­
list approach. They were also one of the first to call 
for auditors to make separate assessments of the like­
lihood of financial statement fraud and the likelihood 
of material misstatements due to error.
Probability of F/S Fraud =
Function of (Conditions allowing fraud to be 
committed, Motivation for management to 
commit fraud, and an Attitude or Ethical Val­
ues allowing management to commit fraud)
— Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988
1This literature review is not all inclusive. We focused primarily on em­
pirical/archival studies and identified projects related to financial state­
ment fraud versus other internal fraud activities.
2In many cases the term “fraud” in those studies was broader than merely 
financial statement fraud.
While earlier research identified numerous potential 
fraud risk indicators, relatively little research has
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empirically examined whether those factors are unique 
to firms experiencing financial statement fraud. With 
the exception of the work by Albrecht and Romney 
(1986), many of these earlier studies only included 
firms where financial statement fraud was alleged to 
be present and excluded firms where fraud was not 
present.
Validation of Fraud Risk Factors. Albrecht and 
Romney (1986), followed by Albrecht and 
Willingham (1993), report some of the first attempts 
to validate the signaling capabilities of factors believed 
to be indicative of financial statement fraud. Albrecht 
and Willingham (1993) report results from a KPMG 
survey of audit partners who served on 27 fraud cases 
and 305 no-fraud cases. KPMG found that eight of 
the 21 fraud risk factors included in SAS No. 53 were 
not statistically different between the fraud and no­
fraud cases. Additionally, they noted that there were 
an additional nine factors not included in SAS No. 53 
that appeared to be strong indicators of financial state­
ment related fraud.
Building upon the KPMG study, Bell and Carcello 
(1998) attempted to validate many of the fraud risk 
factors identified in prior research by empirically ex­
amining whether fraud risk characteristics differed 
significantly for firms experiencing financial state­
ment fraud relative to no-fraud firms on a multivari­
ate basis. They built a predictive model for assessing 
the likelihood of management fraud using logistic re­
gression. The logit statistical model, derived from 
the Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) conceptual 
model, converts identified red flag indicators into an 
assessment of the likelihood of management fraud. 
They found that while many of the factors were sig­
nificant on a stand-alone basis, many of the factors 
were not incrementally significant when considered 
together with other factors in the predictive logit 
model. Their research highlights the difficulties as­
sociated with considering the combination of numer­
ous fraud risk factors when attempting to arrive at an 
assessment of the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud.
Effectiveness of Audit Tools for Fraud Detection.
Other research performed in the late 1980s and early 
1990s highlights difficulties auditors have in assess­
ing the overall risk of material misstatements due to 
fraudulent financial reporting. Pincus (1989) found 
that auditors who did not use “red flag” checklists 
outperformed those who did in an experimental set­
ting. In a separate study, Pincus (1990) focused on 
the effects of individual auditor characteristics on 
fraud detection. She found that auditors who can eas­
ily dis-embed pieces of information and who cannot 
tolerate ambiguous situations were more likely to iden­
tify inventory misstatements due to fraud. Bernardi 
(1994) extended the Pincus (1990) study and found 
that client integrity and competence did not affect the 
auditor’s fraud detection ability except for high-moral- 
development managers (i.e., those who are sensitive 
to ethical situations).
Hackenbrack (1993) found that auditors have differ­
ent opinions about the amount of fraud risk indicated 
by specific “red flag” indicators. He concluded that 
one reason for this disagreement is that auditors with 
different client experience (e.g., large versus small 
clients) have systematically different perceptions of 
the importance of a selected “red flag” factor. 
Bloomfield (1997) conducted a laboratory experiment 
to see how an auditor’s ability to assess fraud risk can 
be influenced by the auditor’s incentives and the 
strength of a client’s internal controls. He found that 
the auditor’s fraud risk assessment is difficult when 
the auditor faces high legal liability for audit failure 
and audits a firm with strong internal controls (i.e., 
the probability of unintentional error is low).
In an effort to assist auditors in their assessment of 
financial statement fraud, Eining and Dorr (1991) 
developed a prototype expert system based on the 
conceptual model in Loebbecke and Willingham 
(1988) that combines the red flag cues into an assess­
ment of management fraud risk. Using this expert 
system as one decision aid, Eining et al. (1997) con­
ducted a laboratory experiment with auditors using 
either the expert system or two other decision aids in 
their assessment of the likelihood of management 
fraud. In addition to the expert system, the other two 
decision aids examined in their study included a fraud 
risk factor checklist and a logit predictive model simi­
lar to an earlier version of the model examined by 
Bell and Carcello (1998). They found that the expert 
system allowed auditors to differentiate the risk of
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management fraud significantly better than auditors 
using the logit model. Auditors using the logit model 
discriminated the risk of management fraud signifi­
cantly better than did those using the checklist.
Role of Corporate Governance. Out of the work 
examining the signaling capabilities of various fraud 
risk factors, there is a consistent finding that the con­
trol environment of the entity under audit is impor­
tant when assessing the likelihood of management 
fraud. For example, Loebbecke et al. (1989) noted 
that “our findings support the importance of the con­
trol environment...Where controls are weak, a sig­
nificant condition exists that would allow either man­
agement fraud, defalcation, or an error to occur (p. 
25).”
More recent studies have focused specifically on the 
role of corporate governance and the assessment of 
the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Beasley 
(1996) examined the relation between board of direc­
tor characteristics and financial statement fraud. He 
found that boards of directors of fraud firms are sig­
nificantly more likely to have smaller percentages of 
outside nonmanagement directors on the board than 
are boards of no-fraud firms, and the tenure of those 
outside directors is lower and the number of other 
directorships they hold is higher. Interestingly, 
Beasley (1996) found no association between the pres­
ence of an audit committee and the likelihood of fi­
nancial statement fraud. Similarly, Dechow et al.
(1996) found that firms committing financial state­
ment fraud have boards dominated by insiders. They 
also found that those firms were significantly more 
likely to have the CEO and chairman of the board 
positions held by the same individual, with that indi­
vidual often being the founder of the company.
McMullen (1996) found that entities with more reli­
able financial reporting (e.g., the absence of material 
errors, irregularities, and illegal acts) are significantly 
more likely to have audit committees. Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) found that in the presence of fraud, 
insiders reduce their holdings of company stock 
through high levels of selling activity. Collectively, 
these studies provide some empirical evidence of the 
importance of the relation between effective corpo­
rate governance and the likelihood of financial state­
ment fraud.
Boards of directors of fraud firms are more 
likely to be composed of smaller proportions 
of outside directors than are boards of no­
fraud firms.
Effectiveness of SAS No. 82. Recent studies have 
focused specifically on components of SAS No. 82. 
Zimbelman (1997) examined the possible effects of 
SAS No. 82 on auditor attention to fraud risk factors 
and audit planning. His results suggest that SAS No. 
82 leads auditors to accept more responsibility by in­
creasing the extent of audit testing irrespective of fraud 
risk and by paying greater attention to fraud risk indi­
cators relating to possible financial statement fraud. 
DeZoort and Lee (1998) evaluated whether the per­
ceptions of users related to the responsibility of the 
external auditor to detect fraud in financial statements 
is greater under SAS No. 82 relative to SAS No. 53. 
They found that users perceive a greater responsibil­
ity on the part of the auditor to detect financial state­
ment fraud under SAS No. 82 than under SAS No. 
53.
Several studies have focused on factors that impede 
the auditor’s ability to detect instances of financial 
statement fraud. As noted by Loebbecke et al. (1989), 
findings by auditors of material instances of financial 
statement fraud are rare. As a result, they note that 
auditors must condition themselves so that perform­
ing audit after audit without encountering a material 
instance of fraudulent financial reporting does not 
make them so complacent that they fail to recognize 
one when it is encountered.
Building upon this reality, Deshmukh et al. (1998) 
applied Signal Detection Theory to the problem of 
detecting management fraud. Their analysis indicates 
that the auditor must accept disproportionate false 
alarm rates in order to maintain audit effectiveness in 
the presence of management fraud. Green and Choi
(1997) developed a neural network fraud classifica­
tion model that employed financial statement related 
data within the revenue cycle. Their model incorpo­
rated financial statement account data that would be 
examined analytically in the planning phase to deter­
mine whether such data are indicative of an increased
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risk of material misstatement due to fraud. They found 
that the neural network models generated few false 
classifications in the absence of fraud and signaled to 
the auditor to perform more additional substantive 
testing when fraud was present.
".  .auditors must condition themselves so that 
performing audit after audit does not make 
them so complacent that they fail to recog­
nize one [a financial statement fraud] when 
it is encountered. ”
— Loebbecke, Eining, 
and Willingham, 1989
Consequences of Financial Statement Fraud. Other 
studies have focused on the consequences of finan­
cial statement fraud. Palmrose (1987) examined the 
relation between occurrences of management fraud 
and auditor litigation. She found that nearly half of 
all litigation against auditors involved management 
fraud, and management fraud litigation resulted in 
larger payments by audit firms. Palmrose’s (1987) 
findings that the existence of fraud was a significant 
factor in auditor litigation are also documented by 
Carcello and Palmrose (1994) and St. Pierre and 
Anderson (1984). Bonner et al. (1998) extended this 
analysis by examining whether financial fraud 
schemes that occur more frequently and whether those 
that involve fictitious transactions and events result 
in a higher incidence of litigation against indepen­
dent auditors. They built their study under the ex­
pectation that juries and judges are more likely to hold 
auditors responsible for failing to detect frauds with 
these characteristics. They found some support for 
the hypothesis that there is a higher incidence of au­
ditor litigation when fraud schemes are frequently 
occurring or involve fictitious transactions and 
events.3
3They also provided some evidence about the most common types of  
financial statement frauds. The most frequent fraud schemes involve 
omitted or improper disclosures, fictitious or overvalued revenues or 
assets, overvalued assets and undervalued expenses or liabilities, and 
premature revenue recognition. While their study was also based on a 
review o f AAERs, there are some differences in findings reported in our 
study from those reported by Bonner et al. primarily because the time 
period of their examination and alternative sources of data used (par­
ticularly litigation related databases) differed from the approach we used. 
Most o f the differences are relatively minimal. The notable difference 
in litigation rates against companies is highlighted in Section III.
“...auditors are more likely to be sued when 
the financial statement frauds are of a com­
mon variety or when the frauds arise from 
fictitious transactions. ”
— Bonner, Palmrose, and Young, 1998
As for consequences to the entity involved, Dechow 
et al. (1996) found a large stock price decline for firms 
when they first publicly disclose aggressive financial 
reporting practices. They also found a significant 
decline in the number of analysts following the firms 
and a reduction in the number of institutions holding 
the firm’s common stock after aggressive reporting 
practices are revealed. Interestingly, Agrawal et al.
(1998) found little systematic evidence that entities 
suspected or charged with fraud have unusually high 
turnover among senior management or directors. In 
univariate comparisons, there is some evidence that 
firms committing fraud have higher managerial turn­
over and inside director turnover. But, in multivari­
ate tests that control for other firm attributes, the rela­
tions between turnover and fraud are not significant 
in the direction expected.
Even though additional research has been performed 
related to the problems of financial statement fraud 
since the late 1980s, there still remains a paucity of 
empirical evidence about the problem of financial 
statement fraud. Much of that limitation is due to the 
lack of available relevant data related to actual in­
stances of financial statement fraud. Much of the 
needed data are not available in public documents, 
and access to confidential information is generally 
restricted due to the sensitive nature of fraud investi­
gations and related litigation.
This research study sponsored by COSO provides 
additional information that may prove useful for fu­
ture research. This report titled, Fraudulent Finan­
cial Reporting: 1987-1997, provides updated insights 
about company and management characteristics as­
sociated with known instances of financial statement 
fraud. These insights should help identify issues that 
can be addressed in future empirical examinations of 
the financial statement fraud problem.
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